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
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THE WARNER CLASSICS

The Warner Classics

Philosophers and Scientists

CHARLES DARWIN.

By Prof. E. RAY LANKESTER

BACON. By CHARLTON T. LEWIS

CARDINAL NEWMAN

By RICHARD HOLT HUTTON

ARISTOTLE

By Prof. THOMAS DAVIDSON

HERBERT SPENCER

By F. HOWARD COLLINS

PLATO. By PAUL SHOREY

New York

Doubleday & McClure Company

1899

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VOLUME ONE
✻
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

J. Dedrick W. Shepley



CONTENTS

VOL. I.

	PAGE
AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE	9
CHARLES DARWIN	
BY PROF. E. RAY LANKESTER	11
BACON	
BY CHARLTON T. LEWIS	35
CARDINAL NEWMAN	
BY RICHARD HOLT HUTTON	75
ARISTOTLE	
BY PROF. THOMAS DAVIDSON	99
HERBERT SPENCER	
BY F. HOWARD COLLINS	119
PLATO	
BY PAUL SHOREY	171



THE CULTURE OF BOOKS.

AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE.



A SERIOUS fact of which we have to take account is that in this restless work-a-day age, the education of most is cut off—"finished," just at the age when the mind begins to acquire a real power of assimilating knowledge, a real power of insight. That capacity to discriminate between what is great and enduring and what is trivial and ephemeral comes only with maturity; and at maturity it chiefly happens that our time and energies begin to be absorbed in the imperative problem of making a living. Our reading—at least our serious reading—is stopped just as we are about to enter the Elysian gates, and we are shut out from that broadening education, that inspiration and uplift which comes through a knowledge of the true master works of literature.

It is this serious condition which led Charles Dudley Warner and a distinguished body of the most eminent scholars and writers of the day to co-operate in the construction of the great Library which bears Mr. Warner's name. The

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

broad purpose which has dominated this work has been to compact into a convenient number of volumes the supreme literature of the world—to separate the gold from the dross—to sift out the greatest work of the greatest writers and thinkers who have ever lived. The aim has been to provide a single Library of such fine and concentrated quality as would take the place of whole shelves of scattered and aimlessly-chosen books and put the reader in immediate possession of the vital and immortal part of the world's literature; that would give him at once the best, the most interesting, and the most valuable of all that has been written since books began to be made.

But even such a Library, though it be, as it undoubtedly is, the finest Library that ever has been brought within such a compass, and valuable as it is to the man whose broad education enables him to rightly use it, might still be to others altogether unavailing—a mere ornament upon the wall—if it lacked the power to stimulate its possessor to enter its halls and make its treasures his own. It is this last perhaps which constitutes the greatest utility of a college; contact with the active minds of able teachers and eager students gives just this stimulus and direction.

To supply this stimulus is precisely the purpose of the really extraordinary series of critical, interpretive, and historical studies which preface

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

every prominent subject, writer or literature included in Mr. Warner's vast work. These masterly essays cover every conceivable topic of general interest in literature, and every one of them has been written by the one man who in all the wide world is best fitted to say the wisest, most authoritative, and most interesting word upon the subject he treats. They are at once an introduction, and exposition and helpful criticism. With their aid the reader no longer explores the treasure-land of books at random, but with sure and certain guidance to that which has received the seal and certitude of Time. They afford just that insight, that sense of intimate acquaintance, and that infectious enthusiasm which is needful to make the study of the world's masterpieces a genuine delight. It is only then that we read with a true appreciation, with a full understanding, with an abiding charm. Thus guided we need no longer waste our hours upon the little books that make a passing stir and then are heard no more.

It is from this brilliant collection that the essays reprinted here are chosen. The name of the "Warner Classics" has been given to these little volumes, because it is believed that they and the great Library, of which they are a part, represent a distinct contribution to popular literature. The studies are in a sense a revival of the essay form which Macaulay, George Eliot,

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

and Carlyle once made so famous; and their aim is essentially the same;—the opening to larger horizons, to broader vistas which quicken the pulse, stir the flagging spirit, and impel one to press on and explore for one's self.

The educational value of such a collection of literature, and exposition of literature, can hardly be overestimated. "A college training is an excellent thing," said James Russell Lowell; "but after all, the better part of every man's training is that which he gives himself. And it is for this that a good library should furnish the opportunity and the means." The chief requisite is that we choose wisely and well. A college cannot make a Newton or a Shakespeare. Education cannot create a genius. As that fine English critic, Frederic Harrison, has said so well, "all that it really can give is this: it can supply the opportunities for self culture and hold forth new standards and ideals to aim at; it can bring the budding mind into contact with the formed and matured mind, and shed over the young spirit the inspiring glow of some rare and beautiful intelligence. Lastly it can open for the learner the door of the vestibule into the great Library of the World's Wisdom."


Charles Dudley Warner and his imposing array of associates have provided such a Library, —undoubtedly the finest single collection of literature that has ever been made in the history of the world. It is an epitome of the wisdom, the

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

progress, the great deeds and the great thoughts of the human race. And further than this,—by means of the introductory studies which bring the reader into intimate contact with the master minds of history, enabling him to understand the conditions under which they worked, their aims and their ideals, to know wherein they succeeded and wherein they failed, in short to realize these men as they lived,—“the door of the vestibule” has been opened.

To this steam-driven age, and especially to the busy men and women of to-day whose time and means and opportunities are limited, this magnificent work comes as a supreme service; it is such a service in that it is not merely a fascinating collection of literature, not merely a treasure-house which one may explore endlessly with an ever-new delight; it is a means and an opportunity for taking up one's education where it has been left off.

More than any work ever published it realizes Carlyle's famous saying that “a collection of books is the true University of to-day.” If there ever was such a thing as a royal road to learning it is here; for a thorough knowledge of the varied contents of these rich and stimulative volumes would be in itself a broad and liberal education.



CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

BY

E. RAY LANKESTER



CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN



CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN, the great naturalist and author of the "Darwinian theory," was the son of Dr. Robert Waring Darwin (1766-1848) and grandson of Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802). He was born at Shrewsbury on February 12th, 1809. W. E. Gladstone, Alfred Tennyson, and Abraham Lincoln were born in the same year. Charles Darwin was the youngest of a family of four, having an elder brother and two sisters. He was sent to a day school at Shrewsbury in the year of his mother's death, 1817. At this age he tells us that the passion for "collecting" which leads a man to be a systematic naturalist, a virtuoso, or a miser, was very strong in him, and was clearly innate, as none of his

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

brothers or sisters had this taste. A year later he was removed to the Shrewsbury grammar school, where he profited little by the education in the dead languages administered, and incurred (as even to-day would be the case in English schools) the rebukes of the head-master Butler for "wasting his time" upon such unprofitable subjects as natural history and chemistry, which he pursued "out of school."

When Charles was sixteen his father sent him to Edinburgh to study medicine, but after two sessions there he was removed and sent to Cambridge (1828) with the intention that he should become a clergyman. In 1831 he took his B. A. degree as what is called a "pass-man." In those days the injurious system of competitive examinations had not laid hold of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge as it has since, and Darwin quietly took a pass degree whilst studying a variety of subjects of interest to him, without a thought of excelling in an examination. He was fond of all field sports, of dogs and horses, and also spent much time in excursions, collecting and observing with Henslow the professor of botany, and Sedgwick the celebrated geolo-

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

gist. An undergraduate friend of those days has declared that "he was the most genial, warm-hearted, generous and affectionate of friends; his sympathies were with all that was good and true; he had a cordial hatred for everything false, or vile, or cruel, or mean, or dishonorable. He was not only great but pre-eminently good, and just and lovable."

Through Henslow and the sound advice of his uncle Josiah Wedgwood (the son of the potter of Etruria) he accepted an offer to accompany Captain Fitzroy as naturalist on H. M. S. Beagle, which was to make an extensive surveying expedition. The voyage lasted from December 27th, 1831, to October 2d, 1836. It was, Darwin himself says, "by far the most important event in my life, and has determined my whole career." He had great opportunities of making explorations on land whilst the ship was engaged in her surveying work in various parts of the southern hemisphere, and made extensive collections of plants and animals, fossil as well as living forms, terrestrial as well as marine. On his return he was busy with the description of these results, and took up his residence in London.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

His 'Journal of Researches' was published in 1839, and is now familiar to many readers in its third edition, published in 1860 under the title 'A Naturalist's Voyage; Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries visited during the Voyage of H. M. S. Beagle round the World, under the command of Captain Fitzroy, R. N.'

This was Darwin's first book, and is universally held to be one of the most delightful records of a naturalist's travels ever produced. It is to be placed alongside of Humboldt's 'Personal Narrative,' and is the model followed by the authors of other delightful books of travel of a later date, such as Wallace's 'Malay Archipelago,' Moseley's 'Naturalist on the Challenger,' and Belt's 'Naturalist in Nicaragua.' We have given in our selections from Darwin's writings the final pages of 'A Naturalist's Voyage' as an example of the style which characterizes the book. In it Darwin shows himself an ardent and profound lover of the luxuriant beauty of nature in the tropics, a kindly observer of men, whether missionaries or savages; an incessant student of natural things — rocks, plants, and animals;

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

and one with a mind so keenly set upon explaining these things and assigning them to their causes, that none of his observations are trivial, but all of value and many of first-rate importance. The book is addressed, as are all of Darwin's books, to the general reader. It seemed to be natural to him to try and explain his observations and reasonings which led to them and followed from them to a wide circle of his fellow-men. The reader at once feels that Darwin is an honest and modest man, who desires his sympathy and seeks for his companionship in the enjoyment of his voyage and the interesting facts and theories gathered by him in distant lands. The quiet unassuming style of the narrative, and the careful explanation of details in such a way as to appeal to those who have little or no knowledge of natural history; gives a charm to the 'Naturalist's Voyage' which is possessed in no less a degree by his later books. A writer in the Quarterly Review in 1839 wrote, in reviewing the 'Naturalist's Voyage,' of the "charm arising from the freshness of heart which is thrown over these pages of a strong intellectual man and an acute and deep observer." The

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

places visited in the course of the Beagle's voyage, concerning each of which Darwin has something to say, were the Cape Verd Islands, St. Paul's Rocks, Fernando Noronha, parts of South America, Tierra del Fuego, the Galapagos Islands, the Falkland Islands, Tahiti, New Zealand, Australia, Tasmania, Keeling Island, the Maldives, Mauritius, St. Helena, Ascension. The most important discoveries recorded in the book—also treated at greater length in special scientific memoirs—are the explanation of the ring-like form of coral islands, the geological structure of St. Helena and other islands, and the relation of the living inhabitants—great tortoises, lizards, birds, and various plants—of the various islands of the Galapagos Archipelago to those of South America.

In 1839 (shortly before the publication of his journal) Darwin married his first cousin, Emma Wedgwood, daughter of Josiah Wedgwood of Maer, and in 1842 they took the country-house and little property of Down near Orpington in Kent, which remained his home and the seat of his labors for forty years; that is, until his death on April 19th, 1882. In a letter to his friend

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

Captain Fitzroy of the *Beagle*, written in 1846, Darwin says, "My life goes on like clockwork, and I am fixed on the spot where I shall end it." Happily, he was possessed of ample private fortune, and never undertook any teaching work nor gave any of his strength to the making of money. He was able to devote himself entirely to the studies in which he took delight; and though suffering from weak health due to a hereditary form of dyspepsia, he presented the rare spectacle of a man of leisure more fully occupied, more absorbed in constant and exhausting labors, than many a lawyer, doctor, professor, or man of letters. His voyage seems to have satisfied once for all his need for traveling, and his absences from Down were but few and brief during the rest of his life. Here most of his children were born, five sons and three daughters. One little girl died in childhood; the rest grew up around him and remained throughout his life in the closest terms of intimacy and affection with him and their mother. Here he carried on his experiments in greenhouse, garden, and paddock; here he collected his library and wrote his great books. He became a man

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

of well-considered habits and method, carefully arranging his day's occupation so as to give so many hours to noting the results of experiments, so many to writing and reading, and an hour or two to exercise in his grounds or a ride, and playing with his children. Frequently he was stopped for days and even weeks from all intellectual labor by attacks of vomiting and giddiness. Great as were his sufferings on account of ill health, it is not improbable that the retirement of life which was thus forced on him, to a very large extent determined his wonderful assiduity in study and led to the production by him of so many great works.

In later years these attacks were liable to ensue upon prolonged conversation with visitors, if a subject of scientific interest were discussed. His wife, who throughout their long and happy union devoted herself to the care of her husband so as to enable him to do a maximum amount of work with least suffering in health, would come and fetch him away after half an hour's talk, that he might lie down alone in a quiet room. Then after an hour or so he would return with a smile, like a boy released from punishment, and launch again

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

with a merry laugh into talk. Never was there an invalid who bore his maladies so cheerfully, or who made so light of a terrible burden. Although he was frequently seasick during the voyage of the *Beagle*, he did not attribute his condition in later life in any way to that experience, but to inherited weakness. During the hours passed in his study he found it necessary to rest at intervals, and adopted regularly the plan of writing for an hour and of then lying down for half an hour, whilst his wife or daughter read to him a novel! After half an hour he would again resume work, and again after an hour return to the novel. In this way he got through the greater part of the circulating libraries' contents. He declared that he had no taste for literature, but liked a story, especially about a pretty girl; and he would only read those in which all ended well. Authors of stories ending in death and failure ought, he declared, to be hung!

He rarely went to London, on account of his health, and consequently kept up a very large correspondence with scientific friends, especially with Lyell, Hooker, and Huxley. He made it a rule to preserve

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

every letter he received, and his friends were careful to preserve his; so that in the 'Life and Letters' published after his death by his son Frank—who in later years lived with his father and assisted him in his work—we have a most interesting record of the progress of his speculations, as well as a delightful revelation of his beautiful character. His house was large enough to accommodate several guests at a time; and it was his delight to receive here for a week's end not only his old friends and companions, but younger naturalists, and others, the companions of his sons and daughters. Over six feet in height, with a slight stoop of his high shoulders, with a brow of unparalleled development overshadowing his merry blue eyes, and a long gray beard and mustache,—he presented the ideal picture of a natural philosopher. His bearing was, however, free from all pose of superior wisdom or authority. The most charming and unaffected gayety, and an eager innate courtesy and goodness of heart, were its dominant notes. His personality was no less fascinating and rare in quality than are the immortal products of his intellect.

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

The history of the great works which Darwin produced, and especially of his theory of the Origin of Species, is best given in his own words. The passage which is here referred to is a portion of an autobiographical sketch written by him in 1876, not for publication but for the use of his family, and is printed in the 'Life and Letters.' Taken together with the statement as to his views on religion, it gives a great insight both into the character and mental quality of the writer. It is especially remarkable as the attempt of a truly honest and modest man to account for the wonderful height of celebrity and intellectual eminence to which he was no less astonished than pleased to find himself raised. But it also furnishes the reader with an admirable *catalogue raisonné* of his books, arranged in chronological order.

A few more notes as to Darwin's character will help the reader to appreciate his work. His friendships were remarkable, characterized on his side by the warmest and most generous feeling. Henslow, Fitzroy, Lyell, Hooker, and Huxley stand out as his chief friends and correspondents. Henslow was professor of botany at Cam-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

bridge, and took Darwin with him when a student there for walks, collecting plants and insects. His admiration for Henslow's character, and his tribute to his fine simplicity and warmth of feeling in matters involving the wrongs of a down-trodden class or cruelty to an individual, are evidence of deep sympathy between the natures of Darwin and his first teacher. Of Fitzroy, the captain of H. M. S. Beagle—with whom he quarreled for a day because Fitzroy defended slavery—Darwin says that he was in many ways the noblest character he ever knew. His love and admiration for Lyell were unbounded. Lyell was the man who taught him the method—the application of the causes at present discoverable in nature to the past history of the earth—by which he was led to the solution of the question as to the origin of organic forms on the earth's surface. He regarded Lyell, who with Mrs. Lyell often visited him at Down, more than any other man as his master and teacher. Hooker—still happily surviving from among this noble group of men—was his "dear old friend"; his most constant and unwearied correspondent; he from whom Darwin could always extract

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

the most valuable facts and opinions in the field of botanical science, and the one upon whose help he always relied. Huxley was for Darwin not merely a delightful and charming friend, but a "wonderful man,"—a most daring, skillful champion, whose feats of literary swordsmanship made Darwin both tremble and rejoice. Samples of his correspondence with these fellow-workers are given below. The letter to Hooker (September 26th, 1862) is particularly interesting as recording one of the most important discoveries of his later years,—confirmed by the subsequent researches of Gardiner and others,—and as containing a pretty confession of his jealous desire to exalt the *status* of plants. Often he spoke and wrote in his letters of individual plants with which he was experimenting as "little rascals."

Darwin shared with other great men whose natures approach perfection, an unusual sympathy with and power over dogs, and a love for children. The latter trait is most beautifully expressed in a note which was found amongst his papers, giving an account of his little girl, who died at the age of ten years. Written for his own eyes only, it is a most delicate and

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

tender composition, and should be pondered side by side with his frank and—necessarily to some readers—almost terrifying statement of his thoughts on religion.

Darwin's only self-indulgence was snuff-taking. In later years he smoked an occasional cigarette, but his real "little weakness" was snuff. It is difficult to suppose that he did not benefit by the habit, careful as he was to keep it in check. He kept his snuff-box in the hall of his house, so that he should have to take the trouble of a walk in order to get a pinch, and not have too easy an access to the magic powder.

The impression made on him by his own success and the overwhelming praise and even reverence which he received from all parts of the world, was characteristic of his charming nature. Darwin did not receive these proofs of the triumphs of his views with the solemnity of an inflated reformer who has laid his law upon the whole world of thought. Quite otherwise. He was simply delighted. He chuckled gayly over the spread of his views, almost as a sportsman—and we must remember that in his young days he *was* a sportsman—may rejoice in the triumphs of his own favorite "racer,"

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

or even as a schoolboy may be proud and happy in the success of "the eleven" of which he is captain. He delighted to count up the sale of his books, not specially for the money value it represented, though he was too sensible to be indifferent to that, but because it proved to him that his long and arduous life of thought, experiment, and literary work was not in vain. To have been or to have posed as being indifferent to popular success, would have required a man of less vivid sympathy with his fellow-men; to have been puffed up and pretentious would have needed one less gifted with a sense of humor, less conscious of the littleness of one man, however talented, in the vast procession of life on the earth's surface. His delight in his work and its success was one of the perfect and natural kind, which he could communicate to his wife and daughters, and might have been shared by a child.

I, who write of him here, had the great privilege of staying with him from time to time at Down, and I find it difficult to record the strangely mixed feeling of reverential admiration and extreme personal attachment and affection with which I came

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

to regard him. I have never known or heard of a man who combined with such exceptional intellectual power so much cheeriness and love of humor, and such ideal kindness, courtesy, and modesty. Owing to the fact that my father was a naturalist and man of letters, I as a boy knew Henslow and Lyell, Darwin's teachers, and have myself enjoyed a naturalist's walk with the one and the geological discussions of the other. I first saw Darwin himself in 1853, when he was recommended to my boyish imagination as "a man who had ridden up a mountain on the back of a tortoise" (in the Galapagos Islands)! When I began to work at and write on zoölogy he showed his kindness of heart by writing to me in praise of my first book: he wrote to me later in answer to my appeal for guidance, that "physiological experiment on animals is justifiable for real investigation; but not for mere damnable and detestable curiosity. It is a subject which makes me sick with horror, so I will not say another word about it, else I shall not sleep to-night." When I prosecuted Slade the spiritualistic impostor, and obtained his conviction at Bow Street as a common

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

rogue, Darwin was much interested, and after the affair was over wrote to say that he was sure that I had been at great expense in effecting what he considered to be a public benefit, and that he should like to be allowed to contribute ten pounds to the cost of the prosecution. He was ever ready in this way to help by timely gifts of money what he thought to be a good cause, as for instance in the erection of the Zoölogical Station of Naples by Dr. Anton Dohrn, to which he gave a hundred pounds. His most characteristic minor trait which I remember, was his sitting in his drawing-room at Down in his high-seated arm-chair, and whilst laughing at some story or joke, slapping his thigh with his right hand and exclaiming, with a quite innocent and French freedom of speech, "O my God! That's very good. That's capital." Perhaps one of the most interesting things that I ever heard him say was when, after describing to me an experiment in which he had placed under a bell-jar some pollen from a male flower, together with an unfertilized female flower, in order to see whether, when kept at a distance but under the same jar, the one would act in

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

any way on the other, he remarked:—
“That’s a fool’s experiment. But I love fools’ experiments, I am always making them.” A great deal might be written as comment on that statement. Perhaps the thoughts which it suggests may be summed up by the proposition that even a wise experiment when made by a fool generally leads to a false conclusion, but that fools’ experiments conducted by a genius often prove to be leaps through the dark into great discoveries.

As examples of Darwin’s writings I have chosen, in addition to those already mentioned, certain passages from his great book on the ‘Origin of Species,’ in which he explains what he understands by the terms “Natural Selection” and the “Struggle for Existence.” These terms invented by Darwin—but specially the latter—have become “household words.” The history of his thoughts on the subject of the Origin of Species is given in the account of his books, written by himself and already referred to. His letter to Professor Asa Gray (September 5th, 1857) is a most valuable brief exposition of his theory and an admirable sample of his correspondence. The distin-

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

guished American botanist was one of his most constant correspondents and a dear personal friend.

I have also given as an extract the final pages of the 'Origin of Species,' in which Darwin eloquently defends the view of nature to which his theory leads. A similar and important passage on the subject of 'Creative Design' is also given: it is taken from that wonderful collection of facts and arguments published by Darwin under the title of 'The Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication.' It cannot be too definitely stated, as Darwin himself insisted, that his theory of the Origin of Species is essentially an extension of the argument used by Lyell in his 'Principles of Geology.' Just as Lyell accounted for the huge masses of stratified rocks, the upheaved mountain chains, the deep valleys, and the shifting seas of the earth's surface, by adducing the long-continued cumulative action of causes which are at this present moment in operation and can be observed and measured at the present day: so Darwin demonstrates that natural variation, and consequent selection by "breeders" and "fanciers" at the present day, give rise to new

forms of plants and animals; and that the cumulative, long-continued action of *Natural Selection* in the Struggle for Existence, or the survival of favorable variations, can and must have effected changes, the magnitude of which is only limited by the length of time during which the process has been going on.

The style of Darwin's writings is remarkable for the absence of all affectation, of all attempt at epigram, literary allusion, or rhetoric. In this it is admirably suited to its subject. At the same time there is no sacrifice of clearness to brevity, nor are technical terms used in place of ordinary language. The greatest pains are obviously given by the author to enable his reader to thoroughly understand the matter in hand. Further, the reader is treated not only with this courtesy of full explanation, but with extreme fairness and modesty. Darwin never slurs over a difficulty nor minimizes it. He states objections and awkward facts prominently, and without shirking proceeds to deal with them by citation of experiment or observation carried out by him for the purpose. His modesty towards his reader is a delightful charac-

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

teristic. He simply desires to persuade you as one reasonable friend may persuade another. He never thrusts a conclusion nor even a step towards a conclusion upon you, by a demand for your confidence in him as an authority, or by an unfair weighting of the arguments which he balances, or by a juggle of word-play. The consequence is that though Darwin himself thought he had no literary ability, and labored over and re-wrote his sentences, we have in his works a model of clear exposition of a great argument, and the most remarkable example of persuasive style in the English language—persuasive because of its transparent honesty and scrupulous moderation.

Darwin enjoyed rather better health in the last ten years of his life than before, and was able to work and write constantly. For some four months before his death, but not until then, it was evident that his heart was seriously diseased. He died on April 19th, 1882, at the age of seventy-three. Almost his last words were, "I am not the least afraid to die." In 1879 he added to the manuscript of his autobiography already referred to, these words:—"As for myself, I believe that I have acted rightly in steadily

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

following and devoting my life to Science. I feel no remorse from having committed any great sin, but have often and often regretted that I have not done more direct good to my fellow-creatures.”


From his early manhood to old age, the desire to do what was right determined the employment of his powers. He has done to his fellow-creatures an imperishable good, in leaving to them his writings and the example of his noble life.

E. Ray Lancaster

FRANCIS BACON

BY

CHARLTON T. LEWIS



FRANCIS BACON



THE startling contrasts of splendor and humiliation which marked the life of Bacon, and the seemingly incredible inconsistencies which hasty observers find in his character, have been the themes of much rhetorical declamation, and even of serious and learned debate. From Ben Jonson in his own day, to James Spedding the friend of Tennyson, he has not lacked eminent eulogists, who look up to him as not only the greatest and wisest, but as among the noblest and most worthy of mankind: while the famous epigram of Pope, expanded by Macaulay into a stately and eloquent essay, has impressed on the popular mind the lowest estimate of his moral nature; and even such careful scholars as Charles de

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Rémusat and Dean Church, who have devoted careful and instructive volumes to the survey of Bacon's career and works, insist that with all his intellectual supremacy, he was a servile courtier, a false friend, and a corrupt judge. Yet there are few important names in human history of men who have left us so complete materials for a just judgment of their conduct; and it is only a lover of paradox who can read these and still regard Bacon's character as an unsolved problem.

Mr. Spedding has given a long life of intelligent labor to the collection of every fact and document throwing light upon the motives aims, and thoughts of the great "Chancellor of Nature," from the cradle to the grave. The results are before us in the seven volumes of 'The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon,' which form perhaps the most complete biography ever written. It is a book of absolute candor as well as infinite research, giving with equal distinctness all the evidence which makes for its hero's dishonor and that which tends to justify the writer's reverence for him. Another work by Mr. Spedding, 'Evenings with a Reviewer,' in two volumes, is an

FRANCIS BACON

elaborate refutation, from the original and authentic records, of the most damning charges brought by Lord Macaulay against Bacon's good fame. It is a complete and overwhelming exposure of false coloring, of rhetorical artifices, and of the abuse of evidence, in the famous essay. As one of the most entertaining and instructive pieces of controversy in our literature, it deserves to be widely read. The unbiased reader cannot accept the special pleading by which, in his comments, Spedding makes every failing of Bacon "lean to virtue's side"; but will form upon the unquestioned facts presented a clear conception of him, will come to know him as no other man of an age so remote is known, and will find in his many-sided and magnificent nature a full explanation of the impressions which partial views of it have made upon his worshipers and his detractors.

It is only in his maturity, indeed, that we are privileged to enter into his mind and read his heart. But enough is known of the formative period of his life to show us the sources of his weaknesses and of his strength. The child whom high authorities have regarded as endowed with the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

mightiest intellect of the human race was born at York House, on the Strand, in the third year of Elizabeth's reign, January 22d, 1561. He was the son of the Queen's Lord Keeper of the Seals, Sir Nicholas Bacon, and his second wife Anne, daughter of Sir Anthony Cook, formerly tutor of King Edward VI. Mildred, an elder daughter of the same scholar, was the wife of William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who for the first forty years of her reign was Elizabeth's chief minister. As a child Bacon was a favorite at court, and tradition represents him as something of a pet of the Queen, who called him "my young Lord Keeper." His mother was among the most learned women of an age when, among women of rank, great learning was as common and as highly prized as great beauty; and her influence was a potent intellectual stimulus to the boy, although he revolted in early youth from the narrow creed which her fierce Puritan zeal strove to impose on her household. Outside of the nursery, the atmosphere of his world was that of craft, all directed to one end; for the Queen was the source of honor, power, and wealth, and advancement in life meant only a share

FRANCIS BACON

in the grace distributed through her ministers and favorites. Apart from the harsh and forbidding religious teachings of his mother, young Francis had before him neither precept nor example of an ambition more worthy than that of courting the smiles of power.

At the age of twelve he entered Trinity College, Cambridge (April 1573), and left it before he was fifteen (Christmas 1575); the institution meanwhile having been broken up for more than half a year (August 1574 to March 1575) by the plague, so that his intermittent university career summed up less than fourteen months. There is no record of his studies, and the names of his teachers are unknown; for though Bacon in later years called himself a pupil of Whitgift, and his biographers assumed that the relation was direct and personal, yet that great master of Trinity had certainly ended his teaching days before Bacon went to Cambridge, and had entered as Dean of Lincoln on his splendid ecclesiastical career. University life was very different from that of our times. The statutes of Cambridge forbade a student, under penalties, to use in conversation with another any language but

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Latin, Greek, or Hebrew, unless in his private apartments and in hours of leisure. It was a regular custom at Trinity to bring before the assembled undergraduates every Thursday evening at seven o'clock such junior students as had been detected in breaches of the rules during the week, and to flog them. It would be interesting to know in what languages young Bacon conversed, and what experiences of discipline befell him; but his subsequent achievements at least suggest that Cambridge in the sixteenth century may have afforded more efficient educational influences than our knowledge of its resources and methods can explain. For it is certain that, at an age when our most promising youths are beginning serious study, Bacon's mind was already formed, his habits and modes of research were fixed, the universe of knowledge was an open field before him. Thenceforth he was no man's pupil, but in intellectual independence and solitude he rapidly matured into the supreme scholar of his age.

After registering as a student of law at Gray's Inn, apparently for the purpose of a nominal connection with a profession

FRANCIS BACON

which might aid his patrons in promoting him at court, Bacon was sent in June 1576, to France in the train of the British Ambassador, Sir Amyas Paulet; and for nearly three years followed the roving embassy around the great cities of that kingdom. The massacre of St. Bartholomew had taken place four years before, and the boy's recorded observations on the troubled society of France and of Europe show remarkable insight into the character of princes and the sources of political movements. Sir Nicholas had hitherto directed his son's education and associations with the purpose of making him an ornament of the court, and had set aside a fund to provide Francis at the proper time with a handsome estate. But he died suddenly, February 20th, 1579, without giving legal effect to this provision, and the sum designed for the young student was divided equally among the five children, while Francis was excluded from a share in the rest of the family fortune; and was thus called home to England to find himself a poor man.

He made himself a bachelor's home at Gray's Inn, and devoted his energies to the law, with such success that he was soon

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

recognized as one of the most promising members of the profession. In 1584 he entered Parliament for Melcombe Regis in Somersetshire, and two years later sat for Liverpool. During these years the schism between his inner and his outer life continued to widen. Drawing his first breath in the atmosphere of the court, bred in the faith that honor and greatness come from princes' favor, with a native taste for luxury and magnificence which was fostered by delicate health, he steadily looked for advancement through the influence of Burghley and the smiles of the Queen. But Burghley had no sympathy with speculative thought, and distrusted him for his confidences concerning his higher studies, while he probably feared in Bacon a dangerous rival of his own son; so that with expressions of kind interest, he refrained from giving his nephew practical aid. Elizabeth, too, suspected that a young man who knew so many things could not be trusted to know his own business well, and preferred for important professional work others who were lawyers and nothing besides. Thus Bacon appeared to the world as a disappointed and uneasy

FRANCIS BACON

courtier, struggling to keep up a certain splendor of appearance and associations under a growing load of debt, and servile to a Queen on whose caprice his prospects of a career must depend. His unquestioned power at the bar was exercised only in minor causes; his eloquence and political dexterity found slow recognition in Parliament, where they represented only themselves; and the question whether he would ever be a man of note in the kingdom seemed for twenty-five years to turn upon what the Crown might do for its humble suitor.

Meanwhile this laborious advocate and indefatigable courtier, whose labors at the bar and in attendance upon his great friends were enough to fill the days of two ordinary men, led his real life in secret, unknown to the world, and uncomprehended even by the few in whom he had divined a capacity for great thought, and whom he had selected for his confidants. From his childhood at the university, where he felt the emptiness of the Aristotelian logic, the instrument for attaining truth which traditional learning had consecrated, he had gradually formed the conception of a more

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SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

fruitful process. He had become convinced that the learning of all past ages was but a poor result of the intellectual capacities and labors which had been employed upon it; that the human mind had never yet been properly used; that the methods hitherto adopted in research were but treadmill work, returning upon itself, or at best could produce but fragmentary and accidental additions to the sum of knowledge. All nature is crammed with truth, he believed, which it concerns man to discover; the intellect of man is constructed for its discovery, and needs but to be purged of errors of every kind, and directed in the most efficient employment of its faculties, to make sure that all the secrets of nature will be revealed, and its powers made tributary to the health, comfort, enjoyment, and progressive improvement of mankind.

This stupendous conception, of a revolution which should transform the world, seems to have taken definite form in Bacon's mind as early as his twenty-fifth year, when he embodied the outline of it in a Latin treatise; which he destroyed in later life, unpublished, as immature, and partly no doubt because he came to recognize in

FRANCIS BACON

it an unbecoming arrogance of tone, for its title was 'Temporis Partus Maximus' (The Greatest Birth of Time). But six years later he defines these "vast contemplative ends," in his famous letter to Burghley, asking for preferment which will enable him to prosecute his grand scheme and to employ other minds in aid of it. "For I have taken all knowledge to be my province," he says, "and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations, and verborosities, the other with blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries: the best state of that province. This, whether it be curiosity or vain glory or nature, or (if one take it favorably) *philanthropia*, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed."

This letter reveals the secret of Bacon's life, and all that we know of him, read in the light of it, forms a consistent and harmonious whole. He was possessed by his vast scheme, for a reformation of the intellectual world, and through it, of the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

world of human experience, as fully as was ever apostle by his faith. Implicitly believing in his own ability to accomplish it, at least in its grand outlines, and to leave at his death the community of mind at work, by the method and for the purposes which he had defined, with the perfection of all science in full view, he subordinated every other ambition to this; and in seeking and enjoying place, power, and wealth, still regarded them mainly as aids in prosecuting his master purpose, and in introducing it to the world. With this clearly in mind, it is easy to understand his subsequent career. Its external details may be read in any of the score of biographies which writers of all grades of merit and demerit have devoted to him, and there is no space for them here. For our purpose it is necessary to refer only to the principal crises in his public life.

Until the death of Elizabeth, Bacon had no place in the royal service worthy of his abilities as a lawyer. Many who, even in the narrowest professional sense, were far inferior to him, were preferred before him. Yet he obtained a position recognized by all, and second only in legal learning to

FRANCIS BACON

his lifelong rival and constant adversary, Sir Edward Coke. To-day, it is probable that if the two greatest names in the history of the common law were to be selected by the suffrages of the profession, the great majority would be cast for Coke and Bacon. As a master of the intricacies of precedent and an authority upon the detailed formulas of "the perfection of reason," the former is unrivaled still; but in the comprehensive grasp of the law as a system for the maintenance of social order and the protection of individual rights, Bacon rose far above him. The cherished aim of his professional career was to survey the whole body of the laws of England, to produce a digest of them which should result in a harmonious code, to do away with all that was found obsolete or inconsistent with the principles of the system, and thus to adapt the living, progressive body of the law to the wants of the growing nation. This magnificent plan was beyond the power of any one man, had his life no other task, but he suggested the method and the aim, and while for six generations after these legal giants passed away, the minute, accurate, and profound

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

learning of Coke remained the acknowledged chief storehouse of British traditional jurisprudence, the seventh generation took up the work of revision and reform, and from the time of Bentham and Austin the progress of legal science has been toward codification. The contest between the aggregation of empirical rules and formulated customs which Coke taught as the common law, and the broad, harmonious application of scientific reason to the definition and enforcement of rights, still goes on; but with constant gains on the side of the reformers, all of whom with one consent confess that no general and complete reconstruction of legal doctrine as a science is possible, except upon the lines laid down by Bacon.

The most memorable case in which Bacon was employed to represent the Crown during Elizabeth's life was the prosecution of the Earl of Essex for treason. Essex had been Bacon's friend, patron, and benefactor; and as long as the earl remained faithful to the Queen and retained her favor, Bacon served him with ready zeal and splendid efficiency, and showed himself the wisest and most sincere of counselors. When Essex rejected his advice, forfeited

FRANCIS BACON

the Queen's confidence by the follies from which Bacon had earnestly striven to deter him, and finally plunged into wanton and reckless rebellion, Bacon, with whom loyalty to his sovereign had always been the supreme duty, accepted a retainer from the Crown, and assisted Coke in the prosecution. The crime of Essex was the greatest of which a subject was capable; it lacked no circumstance of aggravation; if the most astounding instance of ingratitude and disloyalty to friendship ever known is to be sought in that age, it will be found in the conduct of Essex to Bacon's royal mistress. Yet writers of eloquence have exhausted their rhetorical powers in denouncing Bacon's faithlessness to his friend. But no impartial reader of the full story in the documents of the time can doubt that throughout these events Bacon did his duty and no more, and that in doing it he not merely made a voluntary sacrifice of his popularity, but a far more painful sacrifice of his personal feelings.

In 1603 James I. came to the throne, and in spite of the efforts of his most trusted ministers to keep Bacon in obscurity, soon discovered in him a man whom he needed.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

In 1607 he was made Solicitor-General; in 1613 Attorney-General; in March 1617, on the death of Lord Ellesmere, he received the seals as Lord Keeper; and in January following was made Lord Chancellor of England. In July 1618 he was raised to the permanent peerage as Baron Verulam, and in January 1621 received the title of Viscount St. Albans. During these three years he was the first subject in the kingdom in dignity, and ought to have been the first in influence. His advice to the King, and to the Duke of Buckingham who was the King's king, was always judicious. In certain cardinal points of policy, it was of the highest statesmanship; and, had it been followed, the history of the Stuart dynasty would have been different, and the Crown and the Parliament would have wrought together for the good and the honor of the nation, at least through a generation to come. But the upstart Buckingham was supreme. He had studied Bacon's strength and weakness, had laid himself under great obligations, had at the same time attached him by the strongest tie of friendship to his person, and impressed upon his consciousness the fact that the

FRANCIS BACON

fate of Bacon was at all times in his hands. The new Chancellor had entered on his great office with a fixed purpose to reform its abuses, to speed and cheapen justice, to free its administration from every influence of wealth and power. In the first three months of service he brought up the large arrears of business, tried every cause, heard every petition, and acquired a splendid reputation as an upright and diligent judge. But Buckingham was his evil angel. He was without sense of the sanctity of the judicial character; and regarded the bench, like every other public office, as an instrument of his own interests and will. On the other hand, to Bacon the voice of Buckingham was the voice of the King, and he had been taught from infancy as the beginning of his political creed that the king can do no wrong. Buckingham began at once to solicit from Bacon favors for his friends and dependants, and the Chancellor was weak enough to listen and to answer him. There is no evidence that in any one instance the favorite asked for the violation of law or the perversion of justice; much less that Bacon would or did accede to such a request. But the Duke demanded

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

for one suitor a speedy hearing, for another a consideration of facts which might not be in evidence, for a third all the favor consistent with law; and Bacon reported to him the result, and how far he had been able to oblige him. This persistent tampering with the source of justice was a disturbing influence in the Chancellor's court, and unquestionably lowered the dignity of his attitude and weakened his judicial conscience.

Notwithstanding this, when the Lord Chancellor opened the Parliament in January 1621, with a speech in praise of his King and in honor of the nation, he seemed to be at the summit of earthly prosperity. No voice had been lifted to question his purity and worth. He was the friend of the King, one of the chief supports of the throne, a champion indeed of high prerogative, but an orator of power, a writer of fame, whose advancement to the highest dignities had been welcomed by public opinion. Four months later he was a convicted criminal, sentenced for judicial corruption to imprisonment at the King's pleasure, to a fine of £40,000, and to perpetual incapacity for any public

FRANCIS BACON

employment. Vicissitudes of fortune are commonplaces of history. Many a man once seemingly pinnacled on the top of greatness has "shot from the zenith like a falling star," and become a proverb of the fickleness of fate. Some are torn down by the very traits of mind, passion or temper, which have raised them: ambition which overleaps itself, rashness which hazards all on chances it cannot control, vast abilities not great enough to achieve the impossible. The plunge of Icarus into the sea, the murder of Cæsar, the imprisonment of Cœur de Lion, the abdication of Napoleon, the apprehension as a criminal of Jefferson Davis, each was a startling and impressive contrast to the glory which it followed, yet each was the natural result of causes which lay in the character and life of the sufferer, and made his story a consistent whole. But the pathos of Bacon's fall is the sudden moral ruin of a life which had been built up in honor for sixty years. An intellect of the first rank, which from boyhood to old age had been steadfast in the pursuit of truth and in the noblest services to mankind, which in a feeble body had been sustained in vigor by all the virtues

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

of prudence and self-reverence; a genial nature, winning the affection and admiration of associates, hardly paralleled in the industry with which its energies were devoted to useful work, a soul exceptional among its contemporaries for piety and philanthropy—this man is represented to us by popular writers as having habitually sold justice for money, and as having become in office “the meanest of mankind.”

But this picture, as so often drawn, and as seemingly fixed in the popular mind, is not only impossible, but is demonstrably false. To review all the facts which correct it in detail would lead us far beyond our limits. It must suffice to refer to the great work of Spedding, in which the entire records of the case are found, and which would long ago have made the world just to Bacon's fame, but that the author's comment on his own complete and fair record is itself partial and extravagant. But the materials for a final judgment are accessible to all in Spedding's volumes, and a candid reading of them solves the enigma.

Bacon was condemned without a trial, on his own confession, and this confession was consistent with the tenor of his life. Its

FRANCIS BACON

substance was that he had failed to put a stop effectually to the immemorial custom in his court of receiving presents from suitors, but that he had never deviated from justice in his decrees. There was no instance in which he was accused of yielding to the influence of gifts, or passing judgment for a bribe. No act of his as Chancellor was impeached as illegal, or reversed as corrupt. Suitors complained that they had sent sums of money or valuable presents to his court, and had been disappointed in the result: but no one complained of injustice in a decision. Bacon was a conspicuous member of the royal party; and when the storm of popular fury broke in Parliament upon the court, the King and the ministry abandoned him. He had stood all his life upon the royal favor as the basis of his strength and hope; and when it was gone from under him, he sank helplessly, and refused to attempt a defense. But he still in his humiliation found comfort in the reflection that his ruin would put an end to "anything that is in the likeness of corruption" among the judges. And he wrote, in the hour of his deepest distress, that he had been "the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

justest Chancellor that hath been in the five changes that have been since Sir Nicholas Bacon's time." Nor did any man of his time venture to contradict him, when in later years he summed up his case in the words, "I was the justest judge that was in England these fifty years. But it was the justest censure in Parliament that was these two hundred years."

No revolution of modern times has been more complete than that which the last two centuries have silently wrought in the customary morality of British public life, and in the standards by which it is judged. Under James I. every office of state was held as the private property of its occupant. The highest places in the government were conferred only on condition of large payments to the King. He openly sold the honors and dignities of which he was the source. "The making of a baron," that is, the right to sell to some rich plebeian a patent of nobility, was a common grant to favorites, and was actually bestowed on Bacon, to aid him in maintaining the state of his office. We have the testimony of James himself that all the lawyers, of whom the judges of the realm were made, were

FRANCIS BACON

“so bred and nursed in corruption that they cannot leave it.” But the line between what the King called corruption and that which he and all his ministers practiced openly and habitually, as part of the regular work of government, is dim and hard to define. The mind of the community had not yet firmly grasped the conception of public office as a trust for the public good, and the general opinion which stimulates and sustains the official conscience in holding this trust sacred was still unformed. The courts of justice were the first branch of the government to feel the pressure of public opinion, and to respond to the demand for impersonal and impartial right. But this process had only begun when Bacon, who had never before served as judge, was called to preside in Chancery. The Chancellor’s office was a gradual development: originally political and administrative rather than judicial, and with no salary or reward for hearing causes, save the voluntary presents of suitors who asked its interference with the ordinary courts, it step by step became the highest tribunal of the equity which limits and corrects the routine of law, and still the custom of gifts was

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

unchecked. A careful study of Bacon's career shows that in this, as every other branch of thought, his theoretic convictions were in advance of his age; and in his advice to the King and in his inaugural promises as Chancellor, he foreshadows all the principles on which the wisest reformers of the public service now insist. But he failed to apply them with that heroic self-sacrifice which alone would have availed him, and the forces of custom and example continually encroached upon his views of duty. Having through a long life sought advancement and wealth for the purpose of using leisure and independence to carry out his beneficent plans on the largest scale, he eagerly accepted the traditional emoluments of his new position, in the conviction that they would become in his hands the means of vast good to mankind. It was only the public exposure which fully awakened him to a sense of the inconsistency and wrong of his conduct; and then he was himself his severest judge, and made every reparation in his power, by the most unreserved confession, by pointing out the danger to society of such weakness as his own in language to whose effectiveness

FRANCIS BACON

nothing could be added, and by devoting the remainder of his life to the noblest work for humanity.

During the years of Bacon's splendor as a member of the government and as spokesman for the throne, his real life as a thinker, inspired by the loftiest ambition which ever entered the mind of man, that of creating a new and better civilization, was not interrupted. It was probably in 1603 that he wrote his fragmentary 'Proœmium de Interpretatione Naturæ,' or 'Preface to a Treatise on Interpreting Nature,' which is the only piece of autobiography he has left us. It was found among his papers after his death; and its candor, dignity, and enthusiasm of tone are in harmony with the imaginative grasp and magnificent suggestiveness of its thought. Commending the original Latin to all who can appreciate its eloquence, we cite the first sentences of it in English:—

“Believing that I was born for the service of mankind, and regarding the care of the Commonwealth as a kind of common property which, like the air and water, belongs to everybody, I set myself to consider in what way mankind

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

might be best served, and what service I was myself best fitted by nature to perform.

“Now, among all the benefits that could be conferred upon mankind, I found none so great as the discovery of new arts for the bettering of human life. For I saw that among the rude people of early times, inventors and discoverers were reckoned as gods. It was seen that the works of founders of States, lawgivers, tyrant-destroyers, and heroes cover but narrow spaces and endure but for a time; while the work of the inventor, though of less pomp, is felt everywhere and lasts forever. But above all, if a man could, I do not say devise some invention, however useful, but kindle a light in nature—a light which, even in rising, should touch and illuminate the borders of existing knowledge, and spreading further on should bring to light all that is most secret—that man, in my view, would be indeed the benefactor of mankind, the extender of man’s empire over nature, the champion of freedom, the conqueror of fate.

“For myself, I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth: as having a mind nimble and versatile enough to discern resemblances in things (the main point), and yet steady enough to distinguish the subtle differences in them; as being endowed with zeal to seek, patience to doubt, love of meditation, slowness of assertion, readiness to recon-

FRANCIS BACON

sider, carefulness to arrange and set in order; and as being a man that affects not the new nor admires the old, but hates all imposture. So I thought my nature had a certain familiarity and kindred with Truth.»

During the next two years he applied himself to the composition of the treatise on the 'Advancement of Learning,' the greatest of his English writings, and one which contains the seed-thoughts and outline principles of all his philosophy. From the time of its publication in 1605 to his fall in 1621, he continued to frame the plan of his 'Great Instauration' of human knowledge, and to write out chapters, books, passages, sketches, designed to take their places in it as essential parts. It was to include six great divisions: first a general survey of existing knowledge; second, a guide to the use of the intellect in research, purging it of sources of error, and furnishing it with the new instrument of inductive logic by which all the laws of nature might be ascertained; third, a structure of the phenomena of nature, included in one hundred and thirty particular branches of natural history, as the materials for the new logic; fourth, a series of types and models

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

of the entire mental process of discovering truth, "selecting various and remarkable instances"; fifth, specimens of the new philosophy, or anticipations of its results, in fragmentary contributions to the sixth and crowning division, which was to set forth the new philosophy in its completeness, comprehending the truths to be discovered by a perfected instrument of reasoning, in interpreting all the phenomena of the world. Well aware that the scheme, especially in its concluding part, was far beyond the power and time of any one man, he yet hoped to be the architect of the final edifice of science, by drawing its plans and making them intelligible, leaving their perfect execution to an intellectual world which could not fail to be moved to its supreme effort by a comprehension of the work before it. The 'Novum Organum,' itself but a fragment of the second division of the 'Instauration,' the key to the use of the intellect in the discovery of truth, was published in Latin at the height of his splendor as Lord Chancellor, in 1620, and is his most memorable achievement in philosophy. It contains a multitude of suggestive thoughts on the whole field of science, but is mainly

FRANCIS BACON

the exposition of the fallacies by which the intellect is deceived and misled, and from which it must be purged in order to attain final truth, and of the new doctrine of "pre-rogative instances," or crucial observations and experiments in the work of discovery.

In short, Bacon's entire achievement in science is a plan for an impossible universe of knowledge. As far as he attempted to advance particular sciences by applying his method to their detailed phenomena, he wrought with imperfect knowledge of what had been done, and with cumbrous and usually misdirected efforts to fill the gaps he recognized. In a few instances, by what seems an almost superhuman instinct for truth, rather than the laborious process of investigation which he taught, he anticipated brilliant discoveries of later centuries. For example, he clearly pointed out the necessity of regarding heat as a form of motion in the molecules of matter, and thus foreshadowed, without any conception of the means of proving it, that which, for investigators of the nineteenth century, has proved the most direct way to the secrets of nature. But the testimony of the great teachers of science is unanimous, that Bacon

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

was not a skilled observer of phenomena, nor a discoverer of scientific inductions; that he contributed no important new truth, in the sense of an established law, to any department of knowledge; and that his method of research and reasoning is not, in its essential features, that which is fruitfully pursued by them in extending the boundaries of science, nor was his mind wholly purged of those "idols of the cave," or forms of personal bias, whose varying forms as hindrances to the "dry light" of sound reason he was the first to expose. He never appreciated the mathematics as the basis of physics, but valued their elements mainly as a mental discipline. Astronomy meant little to him, since he failed to connect it directly with human well-being and improvement; to the system of Copernicus, the beginning of our insight into the heavens, he was hostile, or at least indifferent; and the splendid discoveries successively made by Tycho Brahe, Galileo, and Kepler, and brought to his ears while the 'Great Instauration' filled his mind and heart, met with but a feeble welcome with him, or none. Why is it, then, that Bacon's is the foremost name in the history of English, and perhaps

FRANCIS BACON

as many insist, of all modern thought? Why is it that "the Baconian philosophy" is another phrase, in all the languages of Europe, for that splendid development of the study and knowledge of the visible universe which since his time has changed the life of mankind?

A candid answer to these questions will expose an error as wide in the popular estimate of Bacon's intellectual greatness as that which has prevailed so generally regarding his character. He is called the inventor of inductive reasoning, the reformer of logic, the lawgiver of the world of thought; but he was no one of these. His grasp of the inductive method was defective; his logic was clumsy and impractical; his plan for registering all phenomena and selecting and generalizing from them, making the discovery of truth almost a mechanical process, was worthless. In short, it is not as a philosopher nor as a man of science that Bacon has carved his name in the high places of enduring fame, but rather as a man of letters; as on the whole the greatest writer of the modern world, outside of the province of imaginative art; as the Shakespeare of English prose. Does

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

this seem a paradox to the reader who remembers that Bacon distrusted all modern languages, and thought to make his 'Advancement of Learning' "live and be a citizen of the world," by giving it a Latin form? That his lifelong ambition was to reconstruct methods of thought, and guide intellect in the way of work serviceable to comfort and happiness? That the books in which his English style appears in its perfection, the 'History of Henry VII.,' the 'Essays,' and the papers on public affairs, were but incidents and avocations of a life absorbed by a master purpose?

But what is literature? It is creative mind, addressing itself in worthy expression to the common receptive mind of mankind. Its note is universality, as distinguished from all that is technical, limited and narrow. Thought whose interest is as broad as humanity, suitably clothed in the language of real life, and thus fitted for access to the general intelligence, constitutes true literature, to the exclusion of that which, by its nature or by its expression, appeals only to a special class or school. The 'Opus Anglicanum' of Duns Scotus, Newton's 'Principia,' Lavoisier's treatise 'Sur la Com-

FRANCIS BACON

bustion,' Kant's 'Kritik der Reinen Vernunft' (Critique of Pure Reason), each made an epoch in some vast domain of knowledge or belief; but none of them is literature. Yet the thoughts they, through a limited and specially trained class of students, introduced to the world, were gradually taken up into the common stock of mankind, and found their broad, effective, complete expression in the literature of after generations. If we apply this test to Bacon's life work, we shall find sufficient justification for honoring him above all special workers in narrower fields, as next to Shakespeare the greatest name in the greatest period of English literature.

It was not as an experimenter, investigator, or technical teacher, but as a thinker and a writer, that he rendered his great service to the world. This consisted essentially in the contribution of two magnificent ideas to the common stock of thought: the idea of the utility of science, as able to subjugate the forces of nature to the use of man; and the idea of continued and boundless progress in the comfort and happiness of the individual life, and in the order and dignity of human society. It has

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

been shown how, from early manhood, he was inspired by the conception of infinite resources in the material world, for the discovery and employment of which the human mind is adapted. He never wearied of pointing out the imperfection and fruitlessness of the methods of inquiry and of invention hitherto in use, and the splendid results which could be rapidly attained if a combined and systematic effort were made to enlarge the boundaries of knowledge. This led him directly to the conception of an improved and advancing civilization; to the utterance, in a thousand varied, impressive, and fascinating forms, of that idea of human progress which is the inspiration, the characteristic, and the hope of the modern world. Bacon was the first of men to grasp these ideas in all their comprehensiveness as feasible purposes, as practical aims; to teach the development of them as the supreme duty and ambition of his contemporaries, and to look forward instead of behind him for the Golden Age. Enforcing and applying these thoughts with a wealth of learning, a keenness of wit, a soundness of judgment, and a suggestiveness of illustration unequalled

FRANCIS BACON

by any writer before him, he became the greatest literary power of modern times to stimulate minds in every department of life to their noblest efforts and their worthiest achievements.

Literature has a twofold aspect: its ideal is pure truth, which is the noblest thought embodied in perfect beauty of form. It is the union of science and art, the final wedding in which are merged the knowledge worthy to be known and the highest imagination presenting it. There is a school calling itself that of pure art, to which substance is nothing and form is everything. Its measure of merit is applied to the manner only; and the meanest of subjects, the most trivial and even the most degraded of ideas or facts, is welcomed to its high places if clothed in a satisfying garb. But this school, though arrogant in the other arts of expression, has not yet been welcomed to the judgment-seat in literature, where indeed it is passing even now to contempt and oblivion. Bacon's instinct was for substance. His strongest passion was for utility. The artistic side of his nature was receptive rather than creative. Splendid passages in the 'Advancement' and 'De Augmentis'

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

show his profound appreciation of all the arts of expression, but show likewise his inability to glorify them above that which they express. In his mind, language is subordinate to thought, and the painting to the picture, just as the frame is to the painting or the binding to the book. He writes always in the grand style. He reminds us of "the large utterance of the early gods." His sentences are weighted with thought, as suggestive as Plato, as condensed as Thucydides. Full of wit, keen in discerning analogies, rich in intellectual ornament, he is yet too concentrated in his attention to the idea to care for the melody of language. He decorates with fruits, not with flowers. For metrical movement, for rhythmic harmony, he has no ear nor sense. Inconceivable as it is that Shakespeare could have written one aphorism of the 'Novum Organum,' it would be far more absurd to imagine Bacon writing a line of the Sonnets. With the loftiest imagination, the liveliest fancy, the keenest sense of precision and appropriateness in words, he lacks the special gift of poetic form, the faculty divine which finds new inspiration in the very limitations of measured language, and whose natural ex-

FRANCIS BACON

pression is music alike to the ear and to the mind. His powers were cramped by the fetters of metre, and his attempts to versify even rich thought and deep feeling were puerile. But his prose is by far the weightiest, the most lucid, effective, and pleasing of his day. The poet Sprat justly says:—

“He was a man of strong, clear, and powerful imaginations; his genius was searching and inimitable; and of this I need give no other proof than his style itself, which as for the most part it describes men’s minds as well as pictures do their bodies, so it did his above all men living.”

And Ben Jonson, who knew him well, describes his eloquence in terms which are confirmed by all we know of his Parliamentary career:—

“One, though he be excellent and the chief, is not to be imitated alone; for no imitator ever grew up to his author: likeness is always on this side truth. Yet there happened in my time one noble speaker, who was full of gravity in his speaking. His language (when he could spare or pass by a jest) was nobly censorious. No man ever spake more neatly, more rightly, more weightily, or suffered less emptiness, less idleness in what he uttered. No member of his speech but consisted of his own graces. His hearers could

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

not cough or look aside from him without loss. He commanded when he spoke, and had his judges angry and pleased at his devotion. No man had their affections more in his power. The fear of every man that heard him was lest he should make an end."

The speeches of Bacon are almost wholly lost, his philosophy is an undeciphered heap of fragments, the ambitions of his life lay in ruins about his dishonored old age; yet his intellect is one of the great moving and still vital forces of the modern world, and he remains, for all ages to come, in the literature which is the final storehouse of the chief treasures of mankind, one of

"The dead yet sceptered sovereigns who still rule
Our spirits from their urns."

Chatter. & Co. 1826

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

BY

RICHARD HOLT HUTTON



JOHN HENRY NEWMAN



IN 'A Library of the World's Best Literature,' Cardinal Newman—though all his writings were more or less closely connected with religion, even the lectures on University Education being chiefly intended to show that no university education could be complete which did not treat the knowledge of God as the keystone of all human science—cannot be denied a very important place; for it was in great measure the form and grace and variety of his literary gifts that secured for him the attention of all English-speaking peoples, and that made him one of the princes of the Church before he died. Cardinal Newman himself fixes on one of the most striking of his literary gifts,—the delicacy of his feeling for words, and

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

for the fine distinctions between related words of the closest affinity,—when he attributes to the influence of Dr. Hawkins (subsequently provost of Oriel) and of Dr. Whately (subsequently Archbishop of Dublin) the habit of delicate discrimination which he acquired under their guidance, and for which he was at one time censured as though it had been in him a latent Jesuitism. As a matter of fact, however, if Newman owed this faculty in any degree to the training or suggestion of Hawkins and Whately, he soon far surpassed his teachers. For undoubtedly Newman founded a literary school in Oxford; the school of which in later days Matthew Arnold, with totally different religious convictions, was one of the most distinguished members. The avowed admiration of the great poet for Newman's style,—for its lustre, and clearness, and grace, for the "sweetness and light" of its manner, the beauty of its rhythm, and the simplicity of its structure,—drew the attention of numbers of less distinguished men to the secret of its charm; and from that time onwards the Oxford school, as we may call them,—men like the late Principal Shairp and the late Lord Bowen,—

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

have more or less unconsciously imbued themselves with its tenderness and grace. Matthew Arnold himself, however, never really rivaled Newman's style; for though in his prose works he often displayed his wish to approach the same standard, his hand was heavier and more didactic, and his emphasis too continuous and laborious. And in his poetry Matthew Arnold deviated even more widely from Newman's manner; for though displaying many qualities which Newman had not, for the greater elegiac verse, he missed the exquisite lightness of Newman's touch and the deeper passion of Newman's awe and reverence. Indeed, Arnold in his nobler poems is always greatest in bewailing what he has lost, Newman in gratefully attesting what he has found.

Before I come more particularly to the nature of Newman's influence on English literature, we must just pass lightly over the story of his life. John Henry Newman was born in London on February 21st, 1801, and lived till August 11th, 1890,—more than eighty-nine years. He was the son of Mr. John Newman, a member of the banking firm of Ramsbottom, Newman & Co., which stopped soon after the peace of 1815, but

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

which never failed, as it discharged every shilling of its obligations. His mother's maiden name was Fourdrinier. She was a member of one of the old Huguenot families, and a moderate Calvinist, from whom Newman derived something of his early bias towards the evangelical school of theology, which he studied in works such as those of Scott, Romaine, Newton, and Milner. He early adopted Scott's axiom that holiness must come before peace, and that "growth is the only evidence of life"; a doctrine which had a considerable influence on his later adoption of the principle of evolution as applicable to theology. He early read, and was much influenced by, Law's 'Serious Call.' At the age of sixteen his mind was first possessed with the conviction that it was God's will that he should lead a single life,—a conviction which held its ground, with certain intervals "of a month now and a month then," up to the age of twenty-eight, after which it kept its hold on him for the rest of his life. He was educated at a private school, and went up to Oxford very early, taking his degree before he was twenty. He took a poor degree, having overstrained himself

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

in working for it. In 1821 he is said to have published two cantos of a poem on St. Bartholomew's Eve, which apparently he never finished, and which has never been republished. He tells us that he had derived the notion that the Church of Rome was Anti-Christ from some of his evangelical teachers, and that this notion "stained his imagination" for many years. In 1822 Newman was elected to a fellowship in Oriel; where, "though proud of his college," which was at that time the most distinguished in the University, he for some years felt very lonely. Indeed, Dr. Copleston, who was then the provost of his college, meeting him in a lonely walk, remarked that he never seemed "less alone than when alone." Under Dr. Hawkins's influence, Newman took the first decisive step from his early evangelical creed towards the higher Anglican position. Dr. Hawkins taught him, he tells us, that the tradition of the Church was the original authority for the creed of the Church, and that the Scriptures were never intended to supercede the Church's tradition, but only to confirm it. Combining this with his early belief in definite dogma as underlying

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

ing all revealed teaching, he entered on the path which led him ultimately to Rome. But it was not till after he had formed a close friendship with Richard Hurrell Froude, the liveliest and most vigorous of the early Tractarians, which began in 1826 and lasted till the latter's early death in 1836, that his notion concerning the identity between Rome and Anti-Christ was thoroughly broken down. His book on 'The Arians of the Fourth Century' was finished in July 1832, and marked for the first time Newman's profound belief in the definitions of the Nicene Creed.

In 1832 Hurrell Froude fell ill, and Newman consented to accompany him and his father on a Mediterranean voyage, undertaken in the hope of re-establishing his friend's health. He traveled with them for four months to the African, Greek, and Italian coasts, and then for three months more, alone, in Sicily; where he caught malarial fever, and was thought to be dying by his attendant, though he himself was firmly convinced that he should not die, since he had "a work to do in England." It was during this journey and the voyage home that he wrote most of the shorter

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

poems first published in the 'Lyra Apostolica,' and now collected in his volume entitled 'Verses on Various Occasions.' During the return voyage in an orange-boat from Palermo to Marseilles, when becalmed in the straits of Bonifazio, he wrote the beautiful little poem, so well known now to all English-speaking peoples, beginning "Lead, kindly light, amid the encircling gloom, lead thou me on."

On reaching home he entered at once on the Tractarian movement; of which indeed he was always the leader till his own faith in the Church of England, as the best representative of the half-way house between Rome and the theory of "private judgment," began to falter and ultimately perished. It was he who elaborated carefully the theory of a *via media*, a compromise between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant view of Revelation; though he himself was one of the first to surrender his own view as untenable. In 1841, having been often hard pushed by his own followers as to what he could make of the Thirty-nine Articles, he published 'Tract 90,' the celebrated tract in which he contended that the Articles were perfectly consistent with

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

the Anglo-Catholic view of the Church of England. Bishop after bishop charged against this tract as a final desertion of Protestantism — which it was; and also as a thoroughly Jesuitic explaining away of the Articles — which it was not, for the Articles were really intended as a compromise between Rome and the Reformation, and not by any means as a surrender to the views of the Puritan party. The tract was saved from a formal condemnation by convocation only by the veto of the proctors, *Nobis proctoribus non placet*; and thenceforth Newman's effort to reconcile his view with Anglican doctrine began to lose plausibility even to his own mind, though he still preached for two years as an Anglican clergyman, and for another two years of silence hesitated on the verge of Rome.

On October 8th, 1845, Newman was received into the Roman Catholic Church. Within two or three years he founded the English branch of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri, and took up his residence in Birmingham; where in 1863 he received the attack of Canon Kingsley, accusing him of having been virtually a crypto-Romanist long before he entered the Roman Catholic Church, and

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

while he was still trying to draw on young Oxford to his views. To this he replied by the celebrated 'Apologia pro Vitâ Suâ'; which made him for the first time popular in England, and built up his reputation as a sincere, earnest, and genuine theologian. In 1870 he was one of the greatest of the opponents of the Vatican dogma of the Pope's infallibility; not because he thought it false, but because he thought it both inopportune and premature, not believing that the limits within which it would hold water had been adequately discussed. This attitude of his made him very unpopular at the Vatican while Pio Nono was still at the head of the Church. But in 1878 Pio Nono died; and one of the first acts of the present Pope, Leo XIII., was to raise Dr. Newman to the rank of Cardinal,—chiefly, I imagine, *because* he had taken so strong a part in insisting on all the guarantees and conditions which confined the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility within the limits for which the more cautious Roman Catholics contended. For eleven years he enjoyed the cardinalate; and died, as I have said, in August 1890.

Except the poems written during his Mediterranean journey, and the sermons preached

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

in St. Mary's,—ten volumes of them, containing many of Newman's most moving and powerful appeals to the heart and mind and spirit of man,—the volumes published after he became a Roman Catholic show his literary power at its highest point; for the purely doctrinal works of his Anglican days (those, for example, on 'The Arians of the Fourth Century,' 'The Via Media,' and 'Justification by Faith') are often technical and sometimes even frigid. Not so his chief efforts as a Roman Catholic; for Newman seemed then first to give the reins to his genius, and to show the fullness of his power alike as a thinker, an imaginative writer, a master of irony, and a poet. His chief literary qualities seem to me to be the great vividness and force of the illustrations with which he presses home his deepest thoughts; the depth, the subtlety, and the delicacy of his insight into the strange power and stranger waywardness of the human conscience and affections; the vivacity of his imagination when he endeavors to restore the past and to vivify the present; the keenness of his irony; not unfrequently the breadth and raciness of his humor, and the exquisite pathos of which he was master.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

In relation to the first of these characteristics of his style, the power which he displays to arrest attention for his deepest thoughts, by the simplest and most vigorous yet often the most imaginative illustrations of his drift,—every volume of his sermons, and I might almost say nearly every sermon of every volume, furnishes telling examples. He wants to show his hearers how much more the trustworthiness of their reason depends on implicit processes, of which the reasoner himself can give no clear account, than it does on conscious inferences; and he points to the way in which a mountaineer ascends a steep rock or mountain-side,—choosing his way, as it would seem, much more by instinct and habit than by anything like conscious judgment, leaping lightly from point to point with an ease for which he could give no justification to a questioner, and in which no one who had not trained his eye and his hand to avail themselves of every aid within their range, could, however keen their intelligence, pretend to follow him without disaster. Or again, let me recall that happy and yet sad name which he gave to our great theological libraries, “the cemeteries of ancient faith,”—

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

a name which suggests how the faith which has been the very life of a great thinker often lies buried in the works which he has left behind him, till it re-excites in some other mind the vision and the energy with which it had previously animated himself. Or, best of all, consider the great illustration which he gives us of the "development" of given germs of living thought or truth in the minds of generation after generation, from the development of the few tones on which the spell of music depends, into the great science and art which seem to fill the heart and mind with echoes from some world far too exalted to be expressed in any terms of conscious thought and well-defined significance. Newman's illustrations are always impressive, always apt, and always vivid.

Of the second point, which is more or less at the root of Newman's power as a preacher, the Oxford Sermons, and the 'Sermons addressed to Mixed Congregations' after he became a Roman Catholic, contain one long chain of evidence. Let me refer first to the remarkable Oxford sermon on 'Unreal Words,' which should be taken to heart by every literary man,

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

and has, I believe, been taken to heart by not a few: though it would certainly tend as much to impose severe restraints on the too liberal exercise of many great literary gifts, as to stimulate to their happiest use. Newman preached this sermon when his mind was thoroughly matured,—at the age of thirty-eight,—and he probably never preached anything which had a more truly searching effect on the consciences and intellects of those who heard him. In it he takes at once the highest ground. He denies altogether that “words” are mere sounds which only represent thought. Since Revelation had entered the world, and the word of God had been given to man, words have become objective powers either for good or for evil. They are something beyond the thoughts of those who utter them; forces which are intended to control, and do control, our lives, and embody our meditations in action. They are “edged tools” which we may not play with, on pain of being injured by them as much as helped. Truth itself has become a “Word”; and if we do not lay hold on it so as to be helped by it to a higher life, it will lay hold on us and judge us and condemn all

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

our superficial uses or abuses of thoughts and purposes higher than ourselves. He shows us how hypocrisy consists just as much in making professions which are perfectly true, and even truly meant by us, but which do not correspond to our actions, as in making professions which do not represent our interior mind at all. "Words have a meaning whether we mean that meaning or not; and they are imputed to us in their real meaning, when our not meaning it is our own fault." Then he goes on to give a curiously searching analysis of the hollow and conventional use which men make of great words, from the mere wish to satisfy the expectations of others, and perhaps from a sort of pride in being able to show that they can enter into the general drift of thoughts which are beyond them, though they do not really even try to make them the standard of their own practice. He points out how glibly we shuffle our words so as to make a fair impression on our teachers and superiors, without ever realizing that we are demonstrating the shallowness of our own lives by the very use of phrases intended to persuade others that we are not shallow.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

The reader will find two passages in these collected sermons—one from the Oxford sermon on 'Unreal Words,' the other from one of the 'Sermons addressed to Mixed Congregations'—that are an illustration of Newman's pungency of style, the most striking evidence of what I have called "the depth, the subtlety, and the delicacy" of Newman's studies "in the strange power and the stranger waywardness of the human conscience and affections." Both of them might be used equally well for the purpose of illustrating the keenness of his irony. Yet the most serious drift of each is the insight it shows into the power of the human conscience, and the waywardness and sophistries of human self-deceit.

Passing to the vividness and vivacity of Newman's imagination when he endeavors either to restore the Past, or to realize for us with adequate force the full meaning of thoughts which pass almost like shadows over the mind, when they ought to engrave themselves deeply upon it, may be cited the wonderful picture which he has given us in 'Callista'—his tale of Christian martyrdom—of what happened in the north of Africa during the Decian persecution of the third

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

century. The passage in which he describes the plague of locusts is, even alone, a sufficient proof of the singular power of his vision in realizing to his readers what he himself had never seen. And I give it without further comment, because it speaks sufficiently for itself. But, impressive as that is, it goes a very little way towards illustrating Newman's great, though discontinuous, imaginative power. It was a much more difficult feat to throw himself as he did into the mind of a Greek girl, devoted, with all the ardor of a lively and eager race, to the beautiful traditions and aspirations of her own people, and to show the unrest of her heart, as well as the craving of her mind for something deeper and more lasting than any stray fragments of the more spiritual Greek philosophy. He makes us see the mode in which Christianity at once attracts and repels her, and the throes of her whole nature when she has to choose between a terrible and painful death, and the abandonment of a faith which promised her not only a brighter and better life beyond the grave, but a full satisfaction for that famine of the heart of which she had been conscious throughout all the various

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

changes and chances of her fitful, impetuous, and not unspotted life. I know nothing much more pathetic, nothing which better reveals Newman's insight into the yearnings and hopes and moody misgivings of a heart groping after a faith in God and yet unable to attain it,—partly from intellectual perplexities, partly from disappointment at the apparent inadequacy of the higher faith to regenerate fully the natures of those who had adopted it,—than Calista's reproaches to the young Christian who had merely fallen in love with her, when she was looking to find a heart more devoted to his God than to any human passion. I give the passage to which I refer, in order to show how truly Newman could read the mind of one weary of the flattery of men, and profoundly disheartened by finding that even in the faith which she had thought to be founded in Divine truth, there was not mastery enough over the heart to vean it from the poorest earthly passion, and fix it on an object worthy of true adoration.

For another, though a very different, illustration of the same kind of power, I may refer to a passage in 'Loss and Gain': the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

story of a conversion to Rome, in which Newman describes the reception of his Roman Catholic convert by his mother,—the widow of an Anglican clergyman,—when he comes to take leave of her before formally submitting himself to the Church of Rome. The mixture of soreness of feeling,—the distress with which the mother realizes that his father's faith does not seem good enough for the son,—and of tenderness for the son himself, is drawn with a master hand. Newman did not often venture into the region of fiction; but when he did, he showed how much of the poet there was in him by painting a woman even better than he painted a man. The curiously mixed feelings of this scene of leave-taking have never received adequate recognition. Imbedded as it is in a story which is hardly a story,—a mere exposition of the steps by which the craving for a final authority on religious questions at last leads a humble and self-distrustful mind to submit itself to the guidance of the Church which claims an ultimate infallibility in all matters of morality and doctrine,—very few have come across it, and those who have, have not succeeded in making it known to the world at large.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

The tenderness and pathos of that passage seem to me almost as great as that of the preceding one. Newman's most intimate college friend used sometimes after his marriage, we are told, to forget whether he was speaking to his wife or to Newman, and to call his wife Newman and to call Newman "Elizabeth," — a mistake very significant of the pathetic tenderness of Newman's manner with those dear to him, and of the depth of his feelings. Another very touching illustration of Newman's tenderness will be found in the poem on the gulf between the living and the dead, however dear to each other, the last twelve lines of which were added after the death of his dear friend, Richard Hurrell Froude.

Of the raciness of his humor, many of the 'Lectures on Anglican Difficulties' bear the most effectual evidence; but the passage which has the greatest reputation in connection with this quality is that in which, just after the panic on the subject of what was then called "the Papal aggression," in 1850, Newman ridiculed in the most telling manner the screams of indignation and dread with which the restoration of the episcopal constitution to the Roman Cath-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

olic Church in England had been received. I doubt whether a real invasion of England by the landing of a foreign army on our soil would have been spoken of with half the horror which this very harmless, and indeed perfectly inoffensive, restoration of Roman Catholic bishoprics to England inspired. It was evident enough that the panic was more the panic with which the appearance of a ghost fills the heart of a timid person, than the panic with which the imminence of a physical danger impresses us. Against physical dangers the English show their pluck, but against spiritual dangers they only show their weakest side; and the great panic of 1850 was certainly the most remarkable outburst of meaningless dismay which in a tolerably long life I can remember. The result has, I think, proved that the actual restoration of the Roman Catholic episcopacy did more to remove the ghostly horror with which the English people were seized in anticipation of that event, than any sort of reasoning could have done. We have learned now what Roman Catholic bishops are, and on the whole we have found them by no means terrible; indeed, often very excellent

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

allies against irreligion, and in social emergencies very earnest friends. But when in 1850, Newman in his lectures on 'Catholicism in England' described with such genuine glee the "bobs, bobs royal, and triple bob majors" with which the English Church had rung down the iniquitous Papal aggression, there was absolutely no caricature in his lively description. If Newman had not been a theologian, he would probably have been known chiefly as a considerable humorist. Some of his pictures of the high-and-dry Oxford dons in 'Loss and Gain' are full of this kind of humor.

I have said nothing, of course, of Newman as a theologian,—a capacity hardly appropriate to a book on the world's best literature. I have always thought that he regarded the Christian religion as resting far too exclusively on the delegated authority of the Church, and far too little on the immediate relation of the soul to Christ. But that is not a subject which it would be either convenient or desirable to enter upon here. Say what you will of the conclusions to which Newman comes on this great subject, no one can deny that he discusses the whole controversy with a calmness and an

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

acuteness which is of the greatest use even to those whom his arguments entirely fail to convince. But my object has been chiefly to show how great an impression he has made on English literature; an impression which will, I believe, not dwindle, but increase, as the world becomes more and more familiar with the literary aspects of his writings.

Richard Holt Hutton

ARISTOTLE

BY

THOMAS DAVIDSON

ARISTOTLE



THE "Stagirite," called by Eusebius "Nature's private secretary," and by Dante "the master of those that know,"—the greatest thinker of the ancient world, and the most influential of all time,—was born of Greek parents at Stagira, in the mountains of Macedonia, in B. C. 384. Of his mother, Phæstis, almost nothing is known. His father, Nicomachus, belonged to a medical family, and acted as private physician to Amyntas, grandfather of Alexander the Great; whence it is probable that Aristotle's boyhood was passed at or near the Macedonian court. Losing both his parents while a mere boy, he was taken charge of by a relative, Proxenus Atarneus, and sent, at the age of seventeen, to Athens to study.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Here he entered the school of Plato, where he remained twenty years, as pupil and as teacher. During this time he made the acquaintance of the leading contemporary thinkers, read omnivorously, amassed an amount of knowledge that seems almost fabulous, schooled himself in systematic thought, and (being well off) collected a library, perhaps the first considerable private library in the world. Having toward the end felt obliged to assume an independent attitude in thought, he was not at the death of Plato (347) appointed his successor in the Academy, as might have been expected. Not wishing at that time to set up a rival school, he retired to the court of a former fellow-pupil, Hermias, then king of Assos and Atarneus, whom he greatly respected, and whose adopted daughter, Pythias, he later married. Here he remained, pursuing his studies, for three years; and left only when his patron was treacherously murdered by the Persians.

Having retired to Mitylene, he soon afterward received an invitation from Philip of Macedonia to undertake the education of his son Alexander, then thirteen years old. Aristotle willingly obeyed this summons;

ARISTOTLE

and retiring with his royal pupil to Mieza, a town southwest of Pella, imparted his instruction in the Nymphæum, which he had arranged in imitation of Plato's garden school. Alexander remained with him three years, and was then called by his father to assume important State duties. Whether Aristotle's instruction continued after that is uncertain; but the two men remained fast friends, and there can be no doubt that much of the nobility, self-control, largeness of purpose, and enthusiasm for culture, which characterized Alexander's subsequent career, were due to the teaching of the philosopher. What Aristotle was in the world of thought, Alexander became in the world of action.

Aristotle remained in Macedonia ten years, giving instruction to young Macedonians and continuing his own studies. He then returned to Athens, and opened a school in the *peripatos*, or promenade, of the Lyceum, the gymnasium of the foreign residents, a school which from its location was called the Peripatetic. Here he developed a manifold activity. He pursued all kinds of studies, logical, rhetorical, physical, metaphysical, ethical, political, and æs-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

thetic, gave public (exoteric) and private (esoteric) instruction, and composed the bulk of the treatises which have made his name famous. These treatises were composed slowly, in connection with his lectures, and subjected to frequent revision. He likewise endeavored to lead an ideal social life with his friends and pupils, whom he gathered under a common roof to share meals and elevated converse in common.

Thus affairs went on for twelve fruitful years, and might have gone on longer, but for the sudden death of Alexander, his friend and patron. Then the hatred of the Athenians to the conqueror showed itself in hostility to his old master, and sought for means to put him out of the way. How hard it was to find a pretext for so doing is shown by the fact that they had to fix upon the poem which he had written on the death of his friend Hermias many years before, and base upon it—as having the form of the pæan, sacred to Apollo—a charge of impiety. Aristotle, recognizing the utter flimsiness of the charge, and being unwilling, as he said, to allow the Athenians to sin a second time against philosophy, retired beyond their reach to his villa at

ARISTOTLE

Chalcis in Eubœa, where he died of stomach disease the year after (322). In the later years of his life, the friendship between him and his illustrious pupil had, owing to certain outward circumstances, become somewhat cooled; but there never was any serious breach. His body was carried to Stagira, which he had induced Philip to restore after it had been destroyed, and whose inhabitants therefore looked upon him as the founder of the city. As such he received the religious honors accorded to heroes: an altar was erected to him, at which an annual festival was celebrated in the month named after him.

We may sum up the character of Aristotle by saying that he was one of the sanest and most rounded men that ever lived. As a philosopher, he stands in the front rank. "No time," says Hegel, "has a man to place by his side." Nor was his moral character inferior to his intellect. No one can read his 'Ethics,' or his will (the text of which is extant), without feeling the nobleness, simplicity, purity, and modernness of his nature. In his family relations, especially, he seems to have stood far above his contemporaries. The depth

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

of his æsthetic perception is attested by his poems and his 'Poetics.'

The unsatisfactory and fragmentary condition in which Aristotle's works have come down to us makes it difficult to judge of his style. Many of them seem mere collections of notes and jottings for lectures, without any attempt at style. The rest are distinguished by brevity, terseness, and scientific precision. No other man ever enriched philosophic language with so many original expressions. We know, from the testimony of most competent judges, such as Cicero, that his popular writings, dialogues, etc., were written in an elegant style, casting even that of Plato into the shade; and this is borne fully out by some extant fragments.

Greek philosophy culminates in Aristotle. Setting out with a naïve acceptance of the world as being what it seemed, and trying to reduce this Being to some material principle, such as water, air, etc., it was gradually driven, by force of logic, to distinguish Being from Seeming, and to see that while the latter was dependent on the thinking subject, the former could not be anything material. This result was reached by both

ARISTOTLE

the materialistic and spiritualistic schools, and was only carried one step further by the Sophists, who maintained that even the being of things depended on the thinker. This necessarily led to skepticism, individualism, and disruption of the old social and religious order.

Then arose Socrates, greatest of the Sophists, who, seeing that the outer world had been shown to depend on the inner, adopted as his motto, "Know Thyself," and devoted himself to the study of mind. By his dialectic method he showed that skepticism and individualism, so far as anarchic, can be overcome by carrying out thought to its implications; when it proves to be the same for all, and to bring with it an authority binding on all, and replacing that of the old external gods. Thus Socrates discovered the principle of human liberty, a principle necessarily hostile to the ancient State, which absorbed the man in the citizen. Socrates was accordingly put to death as an atheist; and then Plato, with good intentions but prejudiced insight, set to work to restore the old tyranny of the State. This he did by placing truth, or reality (which Socrates had found in complete thought, in-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

ternal to the mind), outside of both thought and nature, and making it consist of a group of eternal schemes, or forms, of which natural things are merely transient phantoms, and which can be reached by only a few aristocratic souls, born to rule the rest. On the basis of this distortion he constructed his Republic, in which complete despotism is exercised by the philosophers through the military; man is reduced to a machine, his affections and will being disregarded; community of women and of property is the law; and science is scouted.

Aristotle's philosophy may be said to be a protest against this view, and an attempt to show that reality is embodied in nature, which depends on a supreme intelligence, and may be realized in other intelligences, or thought-centres, such as the human mind. In other words, according to Aristotle, truth is actual in the world and potential in all minds, which may by experience put on its forms. Thus the individualism of the Sophists and the despotism of Plato are overcome, while an important place is made for experience or science.

Aristotle, accepting the world of common sense, tried to rationalize it; that is, to real

ARISTOTLE

ize it in himself. First among the Greeks he believed it to be unique, uncreated, and eternal, and gave his reasons. Recognizing that the phenomenal world exists in change, he investigated the principle and method of this. Change he conceives as a transition from potentiality to actuality, and as always due to something actualized, communicating its form to something potential. Looking at the "world" as a whole, and picturing it as limited, globular, and constructed like an onion, with the earth in the centre, and round about it nine concentric spheres carrying the planets and stars, he concludes that there must be at one end something purely actual and therefore unchanging,—that is, pure form or energy; and at the other, something purely potential and therefore changing,—that is, pure matter or latency. The pure actuality is at the circumference, pure matter at the centre. Matter, however, never exists without some form. Thus, nature is an eternal circular process between the actual and the potential. The supreme Intelligence, God, being pure energy, changelessly thinks himself, and through the love inspired by his perfection moves the outmost sphere; which

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

would move all the rest were it not for inferior intelligences, fifty-six in number, who, by giving them different directions, diversify the divine action and produce the variety of the world. The celestial world is composed of eternal matter, or æther, whose only change is circular motion; the sublunary world is composed of changing matter, in four different but mutually transmutable forms—fire, air, water, earth—movable in two opposite directions, in straight lines, under the ever-varying influence of the celestial spheres.

Thus the world is an organism, making no progress as a whole, but continually changing in its various parts. In it all real things are individuals, not universals, as Plato thought. And forms pass from individual to individual only. Peleus, not humanity, is the parent of Achilles; the learned man only can teach the ignorant. In the world-process there are several distinct stages, to each of which Aristotle devotes a special work, or series of works. Beginning with the "four elements" and their changes, he works up through the mineral, vegetable, and animal worlds to man, and thence through the spherul intelligences to the

ARISTOTLE

supreme, divine intelligence, on which the Whole depends. Man stands on the dividing line between the temporal and the eternal; belonging with his animal part to the former, with his intelligence (which "enters from without") to the latter. He is an intelligence, of the same nature as the sphere-movers, but individuated by mutable matter in the form of a body, matter being in all cases the principle of individuation. As intelligence, he becomes free; takes the guidance of his life into his own hand; and, first through ethics, politics, and æsthetics, the forms of his sensible or practical activity, and second through logic, science, and philosophy, the forms of his intellectual activity, he rises to divine heights and "plays the immortal." His supreme activity is contemplation. This, the energy of God, is possible for man only at rare intervals.

Aristotle, by placing his eternal forms in sensible things as their meaning, made science possible and necessary. Not only is he the father of scientific method, inductive and deductive, but his actual contributions to science place him in the front rank of scientists. His Zoölogy, Psychol-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

ogy, Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and *Æsthetics*, are still highly esteemed and extensively studied. At the same time, by failing to overcome the dualism and supernaturalism of Plato, by adopting the popular notions about spheres and sphere-movers, by separating intelligence from sense, by conceiving matter as independent and the principle of individuation, and by making science relate only to the universal, he paved the way for astrology, alchemy, magic, and all the forms of superstition, retarding the advance of several sciences, as for example astronomy and chemistry, for many hundred years.

After Aristotle's death, his school was continued by a succession of studious and learned men, but did not for many centuries deeply affect contemporary life. At last, in the fifth century A. D., his thought found its way into the Christian schools, giving birth to rationalism and historical criticism. At various times its adherents were condemned as heretics and banished, mostly to Syria. Here, at Edessa and Nisibis, they established schools of learning which for several centuries were the most

ARISTOTLE

famous in the world. The entire works of Aristotle were turned into Syriac; among them several spurious ones of Neo-Platonic origin, notably the famous 'Liber de Causis' and the 'Theology of Aristotle.' Thus a Neo-Platonic Aristotle came to rule Eastern learning. On the rise of Islâm, this Aristotle was borrowed by the Muslims, and became ruler of their schools at Bagdad, Basra, and other places,—schools which produced many remarkable men. On the decay of these, he passed in the twelfth century into the schools of Spain, and here ruled supreme until Arab philosophy was suppressed, shortly before 1200. From the Arabs he passed into the Christian Church about this date; and though at first resisted, was finally accepted, and became "the philosopher" of the schools, and the inspirer of Dante. The Reformers, though decrying him, were forced to have recourse to him; but his credit was not re-established until the present century, when, thanks to Hegel, Trendelenburg, Brandis, and the Berlin Academy, his true value was recognized and his permanent influence insured.

The extant works of Aristotle, covering

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

the whole field of science, may be classified as follows:—

A. *Logical or Formal*, dealing with the form rather than the matter of science:—‘Categories,’ treating of Being and its determination, which, being regarded ontologically, bring the work into the metaphysical sphere; ‘On Interpretation,’ dealing with the proposition; ‘Former Analytics,’ theory of the syllogism; ‘Later Analytics,’ theory of proof; ‘Topics,’ probable proofs; ‘Sophistical Proofs,’ fallacies. These works were later united by the Stoics under the title ‘Organon,’ or Instrument (of science).

B. *Scientific or Philosophical*, dealing with the matter of science. These may be subdivided into three classes: (a) Theoretical, (b) Practical, (c) Creative.

(a) The *Theoretical* has further subdivisions: (a) Metaphysical, (b) Physical, (c) Mathematical.—(a) The Metaphysical works include the incomplete collection under the name ‘Metaphysics.’—(b) The Physical works include ‘Physics,’ ‘On the Heavens,’ ‘On Generation and Decay,’ ‘On the Soul,’ with eight supplementary tracts on actions of the soul as combined with the body; viz., ‘On Sense and Sensibles,’ ‘On Memory and

ARISTOTLE

Reminiscence,' 'On Sleep and Waking,' 'On Dreams,' 'On Divination from Dreams,' 'On Length and Shortness of Life,' 'On Life and Death,' 'On Respiration,' 'Meteorology,' 'Histories of Animals' (Zoögraphy), 'On the Parts of Animals,' 'On the Generation of Animals,' 'On the Motion of Animals,' 'Problems' (largely spurious), 'On the Cosmos,' 'Physiognomics,' 'On Wonderful Auditions,' 'On Colors.'—The Mathematical works include 'On Indivisible Lines,' 'Mechanics.'

(b) The *Practical* works are 'Nicomachean Ethics,' 'Eudemian Ethics,' 'Great Ethics' ('Magna Moralia'), really different forms of the same work; 'Politics,' 'Constitutions' (originally one hundred and fifty-eight in number; now represented only by the recently discovered 'Constitution of Athens'), 'On Virtues and Vices,' 'Rhetoric to Alexander,' 'Œconomics.'

(c) Of *Creative* works we have only the fragmentary 'Poetics.' To these may be added a few poems, one of which is given here.

Besides the extant works of Aristotle, we have titles, fragments, and some knowledge of the contents of a large number more.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY


Among these are the whole of the "exoteric" works, including nineteen Dialogues. A list of his works, as arranged in the Alexandrian Library (apparently), is given by Diogenes Laërtius in his 'Life of Aristotle' (printed in the Berlin and Paris editions of 'Aristotle'); a list in which it is not easy to identify the whole of the extant works. The 'Fragments' appear in both the editions just named. Some of the works named above are almost certainly spurious; *e. g.*, the 'Rhetoric to Alexander,' the 'Economics,' etc.

The chief editions of Aristotle's works, exclusive of the 'Constitution of Athens,' are that of the Berlin Academy (Im. Bekker), containing text, scholia, Latin translation, and Index in Greek (5 vols., square 4to); and the Paris or Didot (Dübner, Bussemaker, Heitz), containing text, Latin translation, and very complete Index in Latin (5 vols., 4to). Of the chief works the best editions are:—'Organon,' Waitz; 'Metaphysics,' Schwegler, Bonitz; 'Physics,' Prantl; 'Meteorologics,' Ideler; 'On the Generation of Animals,' Aubert and Wimmer; 'Psychology,' Trendelenburg, Tors-trik, Wallace (with English translation);

ARISTOTLE

‘Nicomachean Ethics,’ Grant, Ramsauer, Susemihl; ‘Politics,’ Stahr, Susemihl; ‘Constitution of Athens,’ Kenyon, Sandys; ‘Poetics,’ Susemihl, Vahlen, Butcher (with English translation). There are few good English translations of Aristotle’s works; but among these may be mentioned Peter’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’ Jowett’s and Well-don’s ‘Politics,’ and Poste’s ‘Constitution of Athens.’ There is a fair French translation of the principal works by Barthélemy St.-Hilaire. The Berlin Academy is now (1896) publishing the ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle in thirty-five quarto volumes. The best work on Aristotle is that by E. Zeller, in Vol. iii. of his ‘Philosophie der Griechen.’ The English works by Lewes and Grote are inferior. For Bibliography, the student may consult Ueberweg, ‘Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie,’ Vol. i., pages 196 *seq.*

Flower George





HERBERT SPENCER

(1820-)

BY

F. HOWARD COLLINS

HERBERT SPENCER



THE author of 'A System of Synthetic Philosophy,' 'Education,' 'Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative,' 'The Study of Sociology,' and many other articles in periodicals and newspapers was born at Derby on the 27th of April, 1820. His father, William George Spencer, was a schoolmaster in the town, and published a work entitled 'Inventional Geometry': "a series of questions, problems, and explanations intended to familiarize the pupil with geometrical conceptions, to exercise his inventive faculty, and to prepare him for Euclid and the higher mathematics." Though this work received but little notice when first issued, it is now, after many years, coming into use among those teachers who desire to give a more

PHILOSOPHERS

rational course of study to their younger scholars prior to commencing Euclid; to which this little work forms a most excellent introduction, as may be gathered from Mr. Herbert Spencer's own words:—

“To its great efficiency, both as a means of providing interest in geometry and as a mental discipline, I can give personal testimony. I have seen it create in a class of boys so much enthusiasm that they looked forward to their geometry lesson as a chief event in the week. And girls, initiated in the system by my father, have frequently begged of him for problems to solve during the holidays.”

Another work of his, ‘*Lucid Shorthand*,’ was completed in MS. in 1843, but has only recently been published by his son, who also contributes a preface.

Herbert Spencer's surroundings were in fact early differentiated from “the daily round — the common task” of most boys. The conversation which came to his ears was more permeated with the rational interpretation of surrounding phenomena—why and how did such-and-such a thing happen—than is usual now; and still more so at the time of which we write. Herbert Spencer's in-

HERBERT SPENCER

nate love of natural science, and his marvellous faculty of observation, so wonderfully displayed in all his writings, were without doubt largely nourished and increased by his father's love for nature, and especially entomology; a science to which the son devoted much of his leisure,—collecting, describing, and drawing most of the insects about his home. Soon after the age of thirteen he spent some time under the roof of his uncle, the Rev. Thomas Spencer, chairman of the Bath Union, and author of many pamphlets dealing principally with the methods for ameliorating the condition of the poorer people in his and other parishes. The mathematical training which he received here enabled him on his return home to become assistant teacher in his father's school; but finding the occupation uncongenial, and the railway mania being then at its height, Spencer at the age of seventeen joined the profession of railway engineering, and during the next eight years surveyed different parts of the country for the construction of lines. One of these—the Birmingham to Gloucester—may be mentioned, as it is interesting from containing one of the steepest inclines in England. During this period he contributed

PHILOSOPHERS

papers on technical subjects to the engineering journals; and described new methods and instruments shortening in a great degree many of the laborious calculations entailed by railway-surveying, locomotive-engine testing, bridge-making, and so forth. The original drawings made by Mr. Spencer to explain and accompany these inventions are very remarkable from their extreme neatness and accuracy. They appear, indeed, to those who have had the opportunity of seeing them to be the result of engraving on copper.

At the age of twenty-two the opening to the path of his future life may be dimly discerned in some letters which he wrote to the *Nonconformist* (newspaper) on 'The Proper Sphere of Government,' and which were subsequently published as a pamphlet. From this time the literary bent of his nature developed and came into greater prominence; for, giving up railway engineering, he went to London, and from writing articles and leaders in the *Economist*,—the most important weekly newspaper in England dealing with finance and the matters included under the old term "political economy,"—became in 1848 its sub-editor, which office he held

HERBERT SPENCER

for five years. This appointment may be looked upon as one of much value to the future philosopher: it gave a certain amount of leisure, while the occupation it entailed drew his mind more and more to those problems of Sociology with which his reputation will ever be associated, while at the same time it kept him in touch with some of the best intellects of the time, and many lifelong friendships were then formed.

It may be of interest here to mention how some of Mr. Spencer's real leisure has been passed. A severe winter at Birmingham, when surveying for the railway, led him to practice skating, and this to designing a peculiar form of skate bringing the foot nearer to the ice than usual, and enabling the "outside edge" to be swung with much greater facility, even by those having weak ankles. Fishing was always a favorite amusement; and, as he says now in conversation, some of his happiest times were spent in later years fly-fishing for salmon on the west coast of Scotland, when in fact staying with some very old friends in Argyllshire. Of the pastimes usually associated with indoors, two may be mentioned,—billiards and music: the latter, up to the present day, giving him ex-

PHILOSOPHERS

ceeding pleasure when well performed and of that school to which he is partial,—Beethoven, or a simple ballad sung with real feeling, but never a mere display of what has been aptly called “musical gymnastics”; mere difficulties of execution, however well surmounted, never appealing to him.

Two years after he obtained the appointment on the Economist appeared his first volume, and one of importance, ‘Social Statics: or the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of them Developed.’ This was out of print for many years, some of its views not being in accord with the more mature ones of the author; hence in 1892 he published an “abridged and revised” edition, together with ‘The Man versus the State,’—a series of essays to which allusion will be made as the time of their publication comes to be dwelt with. The original edition of ‘Social Statics’ is noteworthy as being the only work which Mr. Spencer wrote with his own hand, all subsequent ones being dictated to a shorthand amanuensis.

The seed which has germinated into the pronounced individualism of Herbert Spencer may be discerned here in its embryonic state:—

HERBERT SPENCER

“ Liberty of action being the first essential to the exercise of faculties, and, therefore, the first essential to happiness; and the liberty of each, limited by the like liberties of all, being the form which this first essential assumes when applied to many instead of one, —it follows that this liberty of each, limited by the like liberties of all, is the rule in conformity with which society must be organized. Freedom being the prerequisite to normal life in the individual, equal freedom becomes the prerequisite to normal life in society. And if this law of equal freedom is the *primary* law of right relationship between man and man, then no desire to get fulfilled by a *secondary* law can warrant us in breaking it.”

Considering the state of knowledge in 1852, when special creation, as contrasted with evolution, was the firm and almost universal belief, we are fully justified in alluding to a short essay which Mr. Spencer wrote in this year as singularly noteworthy; for the “development hypothesis,” as the theory of evolution was then called, is contrasted with special creation, and the latter shown to be logically indefensible:—“ Which, then, is the most rational hypothesis? that of special

PHILOSOPHERS

creations, which has neither a fact to support it nor is even definitely conceivable; or that of modification, which is not only definitely conceivable, but is countenanced by the habits of every existing organism?"

Two years later a long essay on 'Manners and Fashion' was published in the Westminster Review, showing how society develops on its political, religious, and ceremonial sides; how the old forms which society successively throws off have all been once vitally united with it,—have severally served as protective envelopes within which a higher humanity was being evolved. "They are cast aside only when they become hindrances—only when some inner and better envelope has been formed; and they bequeath to us all that was in them of good. The periodical abolitions of tyrannical laws have left the administration of justice not only uninjured but purified. Dead and buried creeds have not carried with them the essential morality they contained, which still exists, uncontaminated by the sloughs of superstition. And all that there is of justice, kindness, and beauty, embodied in our cumbrous forms of etiquette, will live perennially when the forms themselves have been forgotten."

HERBERT SPENCER

The British Quarterly Review of the same year contained a long and valuable article on 'The Genesis of Science,' from which the conclusion is reached: "Not only that the sciences have a common root, but that science in general has a common root with language, classification, reasoning, art; that through civilization these have advanced together, acting and reacting upon each other just as the separate sciences have done; and that thus the development of intelligence in all its divisions and subdivisions has conformed to this same law which we have shown that the sciences conform to."

The year 1855 showed that the doctrine of evolution had taken definite and systematic form in the author's mind, for the first edition of the 'Principles of Psychology' was published. As this subsequently forms a part of the 'Synthetic Philosophy,' its consideration may well be delayed until we come to deal with that as a whole. Similarly the essay published in 1857, 'Progress: Its Law and Cause,' as the ideas and illustrations in it are incorporated in 'First Principles.'

The year 1860 will be remarkable for all time as the date when Mr. Spencer issued his prospectus of 'A System of Philosophy,' an-

PHILOSOPHERS

nouncing that he "proposes to issue in periodical parts a connected series of works which he has for several years been preparing," and giving a detailed outline of them. He announced in all ten volumes; and during the thirty-six years that have since elapsed he has accomplished, in spite of such ill health as would have deterred most men from writing at all, the magnificent total of ten complete volumes,—out of the eleven to which the system has expanded in development,—in addition to innumerable essays and letters on subjects of interest in the domain of politics and economics in their widest sense—to sociology, in fact.

In the interim between the issue of this prospectus and the first volume of the series Mr. Spencer republished, with additions, four essays in a small volume, entitled 'Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical'; which has since become the most popular of his works, and has been translated into French, German, Italian, Russian, Hungarian, Dutch, Danish, Spanish, Swedish, Greek, Bohemian, Japanese, Chinese, and some others, too numerous to mention. It is of such immense value to all those who desire to bring up children on rational prin-

HERBERT SPENCER

ciples that it merits an instructive quotation from each of the chapters. The question asked in the first chapter, What knowledge is of most worth? is answered in these words:—

“Paraphrasing an Eastern fable, we may say that in the family of knowledges Science is the household drudge, who in obscurity hides unrecognized perfections. To her has been committed all the work; by her skill, intelligence, and devotion have all conveniences and gratifications been obtained: and while ceaselessly ministering to the rest, she has been kept in the background, that her haughty sisters may flaunt their fripperies in the eyes of the world. The parallel holds yet further. For we are fast coming to the *dénouement*, when the positions will be changed, and while these haughty sisters sink into merited neglect, Science, proclaimed as highest alike in worth and beauty, will reign supreme.”

Of intellectual education:—

“While men dislike the things and places that suggest painful recollections, and delight in those which call to mind bygone pleasures, painful lessons will make knowledge repulsive, and pleasurable lessons will

PHILOSOPHERS

make it attractive. The man to whom in boyhood information came in dreary tasks; along with threats of punishment, and who was never led into habits of independent inquiry, is unlikely to be a student in after years; while those to whom it came in natural forms, at the proper times, and who remember its facts as not only interesting in themselves, but as a long series of gratifying successes, are likely to continue through life that self-instruction commenced in youth."

In moral education:—

"Remember that the aim of your discipline should be to produce a *self-governing* being; not to produce a being *governed by others*. Were your children fated to pass their lives as slaves, you could not too much accustom them to slavery during their childhood; but as they are by and by to be free men, with no one to control their daily conduct, you cannot too much accustom them to self-control while they are still under your eye."

In physical education:—

"Perhaps nothing will so much hasten the time when body and mind will both be adequately cared for as a diffusion of the belief that the preservation of health is a *duty*. Few seem conscious that there is such a

HERBERT SPENCER

thing as physical morality: men's habitual words and acts imply the idea that they are at liberty to treat their bodies as they please. Disorders entailed by disobedience to nature's dictates they regard simply as grievances, not as the effects of a conduct more or less flagitious. Though the evil consequences inflicted on their dependents, and on future generations, are often as great as those caused by crime, yet they do not think themselves in any degree criminal. . . . The fact is that all breaches of the laws of health are *physical sins*. When this is generally seen, then, and perhaps not till then, will the physical training of the young receive the attention it deserves."

On June 5th, 1862, was issued the first installment of the Philosophy: the first part of 'First Principles' dealing with 'The Unknowable,' and showing that the only possible reconciliation of Science and Religion lies in the belief of an Absolute, transcending not only human knowledge but human conception, indeed:—

"The consciousness of an inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena has been growing ever clearer; and must eventually be freed from its imperfections. The

PHILOSOPHERS

certainty that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty toward which intelligence has from the first been progressing. To this conclusion Science inevitably arrives as it reaches its confines; while to this conclusion Religion is irresistibly driven by criticism. And satisfying as it does the most rigorous logic, at the same time that it gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action, it is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve or qualification."

The second part, entitled 'The Knowable,' deals with the body of knowledge constituting what is usually termed Philosophy or Metaphysics; treats of Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force, considered in themselves and in their relation to each other; and expounds those highest generalizations now being disclosed by Science, which are severally true not of one class of phenomena, but of *all* classes of phenomena, and which are thus the keys to all classes of phenomena. From the study of these components of all phenomena the author passes to the law of their composition, "the law of the

HERBERT SPENCER

continuous redistribution of matter and motion." This, having to cover all phenomena, —whether of inorganic nature, of life, of mind, of society, or of morals,—is necessarily defined in very abstract terms:—"Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."

This extremely generalized conception, forming as it does the center around which the whole of this philosophy revolves, will, to the ordinary reader, prove difficult of comprehension without reading the volume from which it is taken, when a more clear understanding of its implications will arise. The remaining chapters then show that the redistribution of matter and motion must everywhere take place in those ways, and produce those traits, which celestial bodies, organisms, minds, and societies alike display:—

"Thus we are led to the conclusion that the entire process of things as displayed in the aggregate of the visible Universe is analogous to the entire process of things as displayed in the smallest aggregates.

PHILOSOPHERS

“Motion as well as matter being fixed in quantity, it would seem that, the change in the distribution of matter which motion effects coming to a limit in whichever direction it is carried, the indestructible motion thereupon necessitates a reverse distribution. Apparently, the universally coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion — which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in the totality of its changes—produce now an immeasurable period during which the attractive forces predominating cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable period during which the repulsive forces predominating cause universal diffusion; alternate eras of Evolution and Dissolution. And thus there is suggested the conception of a past during which there have been successive Evolutions analogous to that which is going on; and a future during which successive other such Evolutions may go on—ever the same in principle, but never the same in concrete result.”

None of Mr. Spencer's works exhibit more clearly the philosophic grasp of the author in dealing with such stupendous problems, or his knowledge of the principles of such a science as astronomy; in fact, from none can a better idea be formed of his truly encyclo-

HERBERT SPENCER

pedic knowledge. On every page are many and apt illustrations taken from some one of each of the sciences, and showing how thorough is the mastery of the principles of each one.

After this work Mr. Spencer writes:—"In logical order should here come the application of these First Principles to Inorganic Nature. But this great division it is proposed to pass over: partly because, even without it, the scheme is too extensive; and partly because the interpretation of Organic Nature after the proposed method is of more immediate importance. The second work of the series will therefore be 'The Principles of Biology.'"—This, although first published in 1864, is still a classic, and without rival for giving the broad generalizations which hold true of all living beings; whether they be of that simple unorganized form which the *Amœba* displays, the organized representatives of the vegetable kingdom with its ferns, palms, and stately forest trees, or such animals as the earthworm, the butterfly, the lion, or man. Charles Darwin's 'Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life,' dealing with organic evo-

PHILOSOPHERS

lution alone, was published a few years previously—but *after*, of course, the enunciation of the general principle of Evolution by Mr. Spencer; and the results are incorporated in these two large volumes, and form a strong buttress to the truth of the philosophy. How exceedingly near Mr. Spencer was to discovering the principle of Natural Selection—or, as he has since named it, 'Survival of the Fittest'—may be seen by readers of the first edition of 'Social Statics'; for it contains a paragraph from which a skillful dialectician could easily prove that this was really the author's mind when it was written! That such was the case, however, Mr. Spencer has denied. After expounding the laws holding good of all living beings, the volume goes on to speak hopefully of human population in the future. "Pressure of population and its accompanying evils will disappear; and it will leave a state of things requiring from each individual no more than a normal and pleasurable activity. Cessation in the decrease of fertility implies cessation in the development of the nervous system; and this implies a nervous system that has become equal to all that is demanded of it—has not to do more than is natural to it. But that exer-

HERBERT SPENCER

cise of faculties which does not exceed what is natural constitutes gratification. In the end, therefore, the obtainment of subsistence, and discharge of all the parental and social duties, will require just that kind and that amount of action needful to health and happiness."

In 1868 commenced the issue in parts of the 'Principles of Psychology,' a very much amplified edition of the work first published in 1855, and so revised as to form a consistent and systematic part of the philosophy,—the lapse of time between the two editions enabling the hypothesis to take a much higher development. In this learned treatise we see all the phenomena of mind—the emotions, the feelings, and the will—evolved from the simplest constituents, and problems of the most abstract kind, and of exceeding difficulty in logic and metaphysics, dealt with from the evolution standpoint and fully developed; it concludes with a brief outline of the special psychology of man considered as the unit of which societies are composed. With these volumes "a final remark worth making is, that the esthetic activities in general may be expected to play an increasing part in human life as evolution advances.

PHILOSOPHERS

Greater economization of energy, resulting from superiority of organization, will have in the future effects like those it has had in the past. The order of activities to which the esthetic belong, having been already initiated by this economization, will hereafter be extended by it: the economization being achieved both directly through the improvement of the human structure itself, and indirectly through the improvement of all appliances, mechanical, social, and other. A growing surplus of energy will bring a growing proportion of the esthetic activities and gratifications; and while the forms of art will be such as yield pleasurable exercise to the simpler faculties, they will in a greater degree than now appeal to the higher emotions."

In June, 1874, the first part of the 'Principles of Sociology' was published; and the whole of Vol. i., the largest of the series, completed by 1876. The first division, the 'Data of Sociology,' is entirely taken up with a description of the interpretation likely to be given by the primitive man—the savage, or the uncivilized—of the various phenomena which occur at every moment around him:—

"Changes in the sky and on the earth, oc-

HERBERT SPENCER

curing hourly, daily, and at shorter or longer intervals, go on in ways about which the savage knows nothing,—unexpected appearances and disappearances, transmutations, metamorphoses. While seeming to show that arbitrariness characterizes all actions, these foster the notion of a duality in the things which become visible and vanish, or which transform themselves; and this notion is confirmed by experiences of shadows, reflections, and echoes.

“The impressions thus produced by converse with external nature favor a belief set up by a more definite experience—the experience of dreams. Having no conception of mind, the primitive man regards a dream as a series of actual occurrences; he did the things, went to the places, saw the persons dreamt of. Untroubled by incongruities, he accepts the facts as they stand; and in proportion as he thinks about them is led to conceive a double which goes away during sleep and comes back. This conception of his own duality seems confirmed by the somnambulism occasionally witnessed.

“More decisively does it seem confirmed by other abnormal insensibilities. In swoon, apoplexy, catalepsy, and the unconscious-

ness following violence it appears that the other-self, instead of returning at all, will not return for periods varying from some minutes to some days. Occasionally after one of these states the other-self tells what has happened in the interval; occasionally prolonged absence raises the doubt whether it is not gone away for an indefinite period.

“The distinction between these conditions of temporary insensibility and the condition of permanent insensibility is one which, sometimes imperceptible to instructed persons, cannot be perceived by the savage. The normal unconsciousness of sleep, from which a man's double is readily brought back, is linked by these abnormal kinds of unconsciousness, from which the double is brought back with difficulty, to that lasting kind of unconsciousness from which the double cannot be brought back at all. Still analogy leads the savage to infer that it will eventually come back. . . . Such resurrection, shown by the universal fear of the dead to be vaguely imagined even by the lowest races, becomes clearly imagined as the idea of a wandering duplicate is made definite by the dream theory.

“The second-self ascribed to each man at

HERBERT SPENCER

first differs in nothing from its original. It is figured as equally visible, equally material; and no less suffers hunger, thirst, fatigue, pain. Indistinguishable from the person himself, — capable of being slain, devoured, or otherwise destroyed a second time,—the original ghost, soul, spirit, differentiates slowly in supposed nature. Having at the outset but a temporary second life, it gradually acquires a permanent one; while it deviates more and more in substance from body, becoming at length etherealized.

“This double of the dead man, originally conceived as like him in all other respects, is conceived as having like occupations; and from this belief in a second life thus like the first, and also like in the social arrangements it is subject to, there result the practices of leaving with the corpse food, drink, clothes, weapons, and of sacrificing at the grave domestic animals, wives, slaves. . . . The place in which this life after death is believed to be passed varies with the antecedents of the races. . . . Hence at the grave are left fit appliances for the journey: canoes for the voyage, or horses to ride, dogs to guide, weapons for defense, money and passports for security. And where burial on a

PHILOSOPHERS

mountain range entails belief in this as a residence of ancestral ghosts, or where such a range has been held by a conquering race, the heavens, supposed to be accessible from the mountain-tops, come to be regarded as the other-world, or rather as one of the other-worlds.

“The doubles of dead men, at first assumed to have but temporary second lives, do not, in that case, tend to form in popular belief an accumulating host; but they necessarily tend to form such a host when permanent second lives are ascribed to them. Swarming everywhere, capable of appearing and disappearing at will, and working in ways that cannot be foreseen,—they are thought of as the causes of all things which are strange, unexpected, inexplicable.

“But while primitive men, regarding themselves as at the mercy of surrounding ghosts, try to defend themselves by the aid of the exorcist and the sorcerer, who deal with ghosts antagonistically, there is simultaneously adopted a contrary behavior toward ghosts,—a propitiation of them. . . . Out of this motive and its observances come all forms of worship. Awe of the ghost makes sacred the sheltering structure of the tomb;

HERBERT SPENCER

and this grows into the temple, while the tomb itself becomes the altar. From provisions placed for the dead, now habitually and now at fixed intervals, arise religious oblations, ordinary and extraordinary,—daily and at festivals. Immolations and mutilations at the grave pass into sacrifices and offerings of blood at the altar of a deity. Abstinence from food for the benefit of the ghost develops into fasting as a pious practice; and journeys to the grave with gifts become pilgrimages to the shrine. Praises of the dead and prayers to them grow into religious praises and prayers. And so every holy rite is derived from a funeral rite. . . . Besides those aberrant developments of ancestor-worship which result from identification of ancestors with idols, animals, plants, and natural powers, there are direct developments of it. Out of the assemblage of ghosts, some evolve into deities who retain their anthropomorphic characters. As the divine and the superior are, in the primitive mind, equivalent ideas; as the living man and reappearing ghost are at first confounded in early beliefs; as ghost and god are convertible terms,—we may understand how a deity develops out of a powerful man, and out of the ghost of a powerful

PHILOSOPHERS

man, by small steps. Within the tribe, the chief, the magician, or some one otherwise skilled, held in awe during his life as showing powers of unknown origin and extent, is feared in a higher degree when, after death, he gains the further powers possessed by all ghosts; and still more the stranger bringing new arts, as well as the conqueror of superior race, is treated as a superhuman being during life and afterward worshiped as a yet greater superhuman being. Remembering that the most marvelous version of any story commonly obtains the greatest currency, and that so, from generation to generation, the deeds of such traditional persons grow by unchecked exaggerations eagerly listened to, we may see that in time any amount of expansion and idealization can be reached."

The foregoing long excerpt will serve two important purposes: for it shows not only the admirable power of the author to sum up in a short space the long arguments and illustrations of many chapters,—of, in the present instance, more than four hundred pages,—but also it furnishes a brief *résumé* of one of his original theories, showing how his writings are permeated through and through by the principle of evolution; how one fact

HERBERT SPENCER

naturally leads to the next, and this fact to another, and so on until at last we stand in awe before the stupendous generalization to which these steps have led us. Stupendous is the grasp of intellect involved; stupendous in that, compelled to acknowledge the truth of each of the steps, we are forced to accept the veracity of the larger truth to which we have ascended.

Part ii. is entitled 'The Inductions of Sociology,' and deals with all the varied forms which societies have, and their growths, structures, and functions, the sustaining, distributing, and regulating systems, the relations of these structures to the surrounding conditions, the dominant forms of social activities entailed, and the metamorphoses of types caused by changes in the activities. It is here that we come across the great division, or dichotomization, of all societies into the militant and the industrial; into those which are framed on the principle of compulsory co-operation, and those which are framed on the principle of voluntary co-operation. These "two types, when evolved to their extreme forms, are diametrically opposed; and the contrasts between their traits are amongst the most important with which Sociology has

PHILOSOPHERS

to deal." In fact, without a thorough grasp of this, a great deal of the author's work upon Society would be difficult to comprehend,—it underlies so much, and is so frequently coming to the surface. It must not be imagined that these are the highest types of society; for "some pages might be added respecting a possible future social type, differing as much from the industrial as this does from the militant,—a type which, having a sustaining system more fully developed than any we know at present, will use the products of industry, neither for maintaining a militant organization, nor exclusively for material aggrandizement, but will devote them to carrying on the higher activities. As the contrast between the militant and the industrial types is indicated by inversion of the belief that individuals exist for the benefit of the State into the belief that the State exists for the benefit of individuals, so the contrast between the industrial type and the type likely to be evolved from it is indicated by inversion of the belief that life is for work into the belief that work is for life." The multiplication of institutions and appliances for intellectual and esthetic culture, and for kindred purposes, not of a directly life-sus-

HERBERT SPENCER

taining kind, but having gratification for their immediate purpose, tends to support this prospect.

The many facts contemplated in these 'Inductions' unite in proving that social evolution forms a part of evolution at large, and fulfills in all respects the general formula: there is integration both by simple increase of mass, and by coalescence and re-coalescence of masses; there is a change from homogeneity to heterogeneity, — from the simple tribe alike in all its parts to the civilized nation full of unlikenesses; there is greater coherence,—for while the wandering tribe is held together by no bonds, a civilized nation will hold together for hundreds of years, nay, thousands; there is greater definiteness,—arrangements become settled and slowly more precise, customs pass into laws which become more fixed and specific, and all institutions, at first confusedly intermingled, slowly separate at the same time that each within itself marks off more distinctly its component parts.

Part iii., 'Domestic Institutions,' deals with the general phenomena of race maintenance, and the diverse interests of the species, of the parents, and of the offspring; the

PHILOSOPHERS

primitive relations of the sexes from the early period of promiscuity to the latest form, that of monogamy; and the status of women and of children. In all of which the law of evolution in general is shown to hold good, and that the higher traits in the relations of the sexes to one another and to children, which have accompanied social evolution, have been made possible by those higher traits of intelligence and feeling produced by the experiences and disciplines of progressing social states.

One of the most prominent changes in the future may be the greater care of parents by offspring. "At present the latter days of the old whose married children live away from them are made dreary by the lack of those pleasures yielded by the constant society of descendants; but a time may be expected when this evil will be met by an attachment of adults to their aged parents which, if not as strong as that of parents to children, approaches it in strength. . . . When the earlier stages of education passed through in the domestic circle have come to yield, as they will in ways scarcely dreamt of at present, daily occasions for the strengthening of sympathy, intellectual and moral, then

HERBERT SPENCER

will the latter days of life be smoothed by a greater filial care, reciprocating the greater parental care bestowed in earlier life."

Part iv., 'Ceremonial Institutions,' shows how the formula of evolution is conformed to by the history of Trophies, Mutilations, Presents, Visits, Obeisances, Titles, Badges, Costumes, and all the varied forms of class distinction. It is shown that "rules of behavior are not results of conventions at one time or other deliberately made, as people tacitly assume: contrariwise, they are the natural products of social life which have gradually evolved." They are, of course, characteristic of the militant type of society, and tend to fade and decay as industrialism and voluntary co-operation develop.

Part v., 'Political Institutions,' contains an account of the evolution of governments as determined by natural causes. Setting out with an unorganized horde including both sexes and all ages, we see that when some public question, such as that of migration or of defense against enemies, has to be decided the assembled individuals fall more or less clearly into two divisions. The elder, the stronger, and those whose sagacity and cour-

PHILOSOPHERS

age have been proved by experience will form the smaller part who carry on the discussion; while the larger part, formed of the young, weak, and undistinguished, will be listeners who do no more than express from time to time assent or dissent. Among the leaders there is sure to be some one distinguished warrior, or aged hunter, who will have more than his individual share in forming the plan finally acted upon. That is to say, the entire assemblage will resolve itself, as in every public meeting of the present day, into three parts, which will eventually develop into that of chief or king, a ministry or representative and consultative body, and the general electorate. Or, in the formula of evolution, the advance will be from small incoherent social aggregates to great coherent ones, which while becoming integrated will pass from uniformity to multiformity, and from indefiniteness to definiteness of political organization. But the conclusion of profoundest moment, to which all lines of argument converge, is that the possibility of a high social state, political as well as general, fundamentally depends on the cessation of war. Persistent militancy, maintaining adapted institutions, must inev-

HERBERT SPENCER

itably prevent, or else neutralize, changes in the direction of more equitable institutions and laws; while permanent peace will of necessity be followed by social ameliorations of every kind. A study of 'Political Institutions' may lead some to think whether the arrangements they are advocating involve increase of that public regulation characterizing the militant type, or whether they tend to produce that better regulation, that greater individuality, and that more extended voluntary co-operation characterizing the industrial type.

Among social phenomena, those presented by 'Ecclesiastical Institutions,' Part vi., illustrate very clearly the general law of evolution. From the primitive undifferentiated social aggregate, in which domestic, civil, and religious subordination are at first carried on in like ways by the same agencies, develops the definite, coherent, and heterogeneous ecclesiastical organization. With this structural differentiation is a functional differentiation of deep and profound significance. Two sacerdotal duties, which were at first parts of the same, have been slowly separating: the first is the carrying on of worship, the second is the insistence on rules of

PHILOSOPHERS

conduct. If we compare modern with medieval Europeans, when fasts were habitual, penances common, and men made pilgrimages and built shrines, we see that with social progress has gone a marked diminution of religious observances, and a marked increase in ethical injunctions and exhortations. At the present day dogmatic theology, with its promises of rewards and threats of damnation, bears a diminishing ratio to the insistences on justice, honesty, kindness, and sincerity. And now, what may we infer will be the evolution of religious ideas and sentiments throughout the future? "The conception of the First Cause, which has been enlarging from the beginning, must go on enlarging, until by disappearance of its limits it becomes a consciousness which transcends the forms of distinct thought, though it forever remains a consciousness." "One truth must grow ever clearer, — the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifested, to which man can conceive neither beginning nor end. Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and

HERBERT SPENCER

Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed."

In due course, were they written, should here follow the remaining parts of the 'Principles of Sociology,' dealing with Progress—Linguistic, Intellectual, Moral, Esthetic; but, as Mr. Spencer says in the preface to the last volume he has written, for an invalid of seventy-six to deal adequately with topics so extensive and complex is obviously impossible. In strict order these parts should, of course, have appeared before the 'Principles of Ethics'; but Mr. Spencer thought it better to pass over them, fearing that the state of his health, which for some years had been below its usual low average, might prevent his completing that part of the Philosophy to which all the preceding volumes led, and which, with many others of the highest intellect, he thought to be the most important of all. This work was completed in April, 1893, although the first part, 'The Data of Ethics,' had been published some years previously; Mr. Spencer "being the more anxious to indicate in outline, if he cannot complete, this final work, because the establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral

PHILOSOPHERS

injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it."

Part i. of the 'Principles of Ethics'—the 'Data of Ethics'—is concerned with the various views which may be held about conduct; and shows that "no school can avoid for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling, called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception." We then have those generalizations furnished by Biology, Psychology, and Sociology which underlie a true theory of living; passing on to the discussion on Selfishness and Unselfishness,—“egoism and altruism,”—showing that a pure and unqualified form of either is impossible, and that there must be a compromise or “conciliation”; which leads us, on the evolution hypothesis, to a consideration of absolute and relative ethics, or the conduct of the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state, and the conduct of man as he is in

HERBERT SPENCER

existing society, surrounded by the evils of a not perfect adaptation.

Part ii., 'The Inductions of Ethics,' is a statement of those rules of human action which are registered as essential laws by all civilized nations: in other words, the generalizations of expediency. Disregarding the conventional limits of ethics, here are treated such matters as aggression, robbery, revenge, justice, generosity, humanity, veracity, obedience, industry, temperance, and chastity: and we are shown that with militancy goes pride in aggression and robbery, revenge and lying, obedience to despotic rulers, and contempt for industry; while with industrialism all these feelings are reversed, — leading to the not unreasonable inference that there needs but a continuance of absolute peace externally, and non-aggression internally, to insure the molding of man into a form naturally characterized by all the virtues!

Part iii., 'The Ethics of Individual Life,' is short, and deals with those modes of private action which must result from the eventual equilibration of internal desires and external needs. The headings of the chapters — Activity, Rest, Nutrition, Stimulation, Culture, Amusements, Marriage, and Parent-

PHILOSOPHERS

hood—are instructive as showing the scope here given to "Ethics." Generally, this division gives definiteness to the idea of proportion; to the maintenance, that is, of balanced amounts of the activities, bodily and mental, required for complete health and happiness. Until the activities are spontaneously regulated by the natural promptings, these ethics must keep clearly in view, and continually emphasize, the needs to which the nature has to be adjusted; but the nature must not be too much strained out of its inherited form, for the normal remolding can go on but slowly.

Part iv., 'Justice,' coincides in area with the author's first work alluded to above, 'Social Statics,' but differs in its treatment in leaving out entirely all supernaturalistic interpretation; in definitely setting forth and elaborating a biological origin for Ethics; and in making much more frequent use of inductive verification. The formula of Justice here given is most important, and of far-reaching consequences in Mr. Spencer's individualistic theory of politics. It is, "*Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.*" Calling the several particular free-

HERBERT SPENCER

doms of each man his *rights*, we find them enumerated under such titles as physical integrity, free motion, property, free exchange and contract, free industry, free belief and worship, free speech and publication. And absolute Ethics asserts each of these. But the preservation of the species, or that variety of it constituting a society, being an end which must take precedence of individual preservation, it follows that relative Ethics justifies, and indeed warrants, such equitably distributed taxation, whether of property, industry, belief, or what not, as may be required for maintaining social order and safety. There has still to be considered, from the ethical point of view, the political position of women. Now, men are liable to furnish contingents to the army and the navy; hence, ethically considered, as women have not to furnish them, their equal "political rights" cannot be entertained until there is permanent peace, when only will it be possible to consider such equalization. The rights of children are complicated by the fact that while at first they are dependent on their parents for general sustentation, they but gradually and slowly grow out of this state and become independent and able to support

themselves. 'Justice' then goes on to consider the duties of the State, which are defined as the maintenance of the conditions under which each citizen may gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest lives of his fellow-citizens. And many reasons are given that this can only be done efficiently by limiting as far as possible the number and variety of those duties.

In Part v. we have 'Negative Beneficence,'—a few short chapters dealing with those minor self-restraints which are dictated by what may be called passive sympathy. Free competition, free contract, undeserved payments, displays of ability, and the administration of blame and praise are all areas in which negative beneficence may legitimately be displayed. The most eminent professional men may so restrain their practice by enlarged fees as not to ruin those only a little less able; the unexpected occurrence of rock in a tunnel which has been contracted for may justify a payment beyond the price contracted for; unmusical street musicians without their undeserved payments would take to some occupation for which they are less unfit; and those capable of monopolizing the whole attention of a dinner party may so

HERBERT SPENCER

restrain themselves as to allow the less distinguished to join in the exchange of thoughts. The origin of the obligation to this beneficence is of course conduciveness to happiness, immediate or remote, or both; and consequent conduciveness to maintenance of the species or the variety, regarded as hereafter the recipient of increased happiness.

This being the origin also of 'Positive Beneficence,' we are naturally led on to Part vi., comprehending all those modes of conduct dictated by active sympathy, which imply pleasure in giving pleasure,—modes of conduct that social adaptation has induced and must render ever more general; and which, in becoming universal, must fill to the full the possible measure of human happiness. Of the various beneficences here treated are the marital, the parental, the filial, aid to the sick and injured, to friends, to poor, and social and political altruism. Beyond these there is the beneficent regulation of conduct toward those who occupy positions of subordination; and here is a large sphere opened for the anodyne influence of sympathy. Along with the substitution of industrialism for militancy there has been a relaxation of those customs which remind

PHILOSOPHERS

men of their respective grades, until we now find one trait of a true gentleman defined as the ability successfully to make those who rank below him in the social scale at ease in his presence. And here we are brought round once more to the fact that our present social state is transitional. The dictates of absolute ethics being kept before us as the ideal, we must little by little mold the real into conformity with them as fast as the nature of things permits; meanwhile letting the chief temporary function of beneficence be to mitigate the sufferings accompanying the transition. The miseries of readaptation are necessary; but there are accompanying unnecessary miseries which may with universal advantage be excluded.

“It seems not only rational to believe in some further evolution, but irrational to doubt it — irrational to suppose that the causes which have in the past worked such wonderful effects will in the future work no effects. Not expecting that any existing society will reach a high organization, nor that any of the varieties of men now living will become fully adapted to social life, a few yet look forward . . . to the evolution of a Humanity adjusted to the requirements of its

HERBERT SPENCER

life. And along with this belief there arises, in an increasing number, the desire to further the development. . . . Hereafter the highest ambition of the beneficent will be to have a share—even though an utterly inappreciable and unknown share—in the ‘making of Man.’ Experience occasionally shows that there may arise extreme interest in pursuing entirely unselfish ends; and as time goes on there will be more and more of those whose unselfish end will be the further evolution of Humanity. While contemplating from the heights of thought that far-off life of the race never to be enjoyed by them, but only by a remote posterity, they will feel a calm pleasure in the consciousness of having aided the advance toward it.”

These words end the ‘System of Synthetic Philosophy.’ Before, however, making any general remarks upon it, we will allude to two works which the author completed while it was in progress.

The one was ‘The Study of Sociology,’ published simultaneously in the Contemporary Review in England, and in the first numbers of the Popular Science Monthly in America, in 1873; subsequently in the ‘International Scientific Series,’ and then in the

PHILOSOPHERS

library edition, making it uniform with all the author's other works. After 'Education' it is the most popular, very many thousands having been sold,—a fact in part attributable to the literary style, which differs entirely from that of the 'System' in being as light and popular as the subject-matter permits. The early chapters deal with the crying need there is for a science of Society: or, to put it in other words, for a science which may serve to the representatives in parliaments and senates as a guide for the making of laws and enactments for the general benefit of the States; which shall serve to point out the broad principles which should underlie the regulation of matters in a corporate society. The difficulties of such a science are then more or less completely dealt with. Beyond the objective difficulties,—the vitiations of evidence due to random observation, enthusiasms, prepossessions, self-interests, and so forth,—there are the subjective difficulties due to the emotions and intellect of the observer, the bias caused by his education, by his patriotism, by the class to which he belongs, by his early political surroundings,—whether Tory, Liberal, or Republican,—by his religious environment, and by the

HERBERT SPENCER

general discipline to which he has been subjected. The work concludes with the sciences best adapted to train an intellect for such study.

The other work, 'The Man *versus* the State,' in four parts, was originally published in the Contemporary Review for 1884; and is now included, as previously mentioned, in one volume with the third edition of 'Social Statics.' The first part is entitled 'The New Toryism,' and shows how Toryism and Liberalism originally emerged, the one from militancy or compulsory co-operation, and the other from industrialism or voluntary co-operation. But as Liberalism has in recent years been extending the system of compulsion in many, if not all, directions, it is merely a new form of Toryism.

The second part, 'The Coming Slavery,' is devoted to a logical examination of socialism; and demonstrates how, if its development be unfettered, it can lead to no other result than slavery, neither more nor less. 'The Sins of Legislators' forms the title of the third part; and shows how the legislator is morally blameless or morally blameworthy according as he has or has not made himself acquainted with the several classes

PHILOSOPHERS

of facts obtainable by a study of legislative experiences, and their results, in former years. "The legislator who is wholly or in great part uninformed concerning the matters of fact which he must examine before his opinion on a proposed law can be of any value, and who nevertheless helps to pass that law, can no more be absolved if misery and mortality result than the journeyman druggist can be absolved when death is caused by the medicine he ignorantly prescribes." The great political superstition of the past was the divine right of kings. 'The Great Political Superstition' of the present is the divine right of parliaments. The author here in the fourth part shows this to be really the divine right of majorities. "This is the current theory which all accept without proof, as self-evident truth." Criticism, however, shows it to be the reverse; and hence the conclusion is drawn that "The function of Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the power of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the powers of parliaments."

Since the foregoing Mr. Spencer has published several important essays on the bio-

HERBERT SPENCER

logical question, Are acquired characters inherited? affirming, in contradistinction to Weissmann, that they are, and supporting his contentions with a mass of facts which had previously not been utilized in this connection. This problem is so extremely complex that no definite and generally accepted conclusion seems at present possible.

What approval, or what criticism, is it possible to pass upon the great work of so great a man? None, will be the answer of all those, if any there be, who thoroughly comprehend the implications of this vast system of thought. We are too near to be able to get the perspective necessary to see its true relations. Perhaps at some future time, in decades and centuries to come, when minds are more attuned to the keynote of evolution, will it be possible to form some adequate conception of its comparative relation to knowledge in general. In the mean time we must rest satisfied with the opinions that have been formed by those most capable of judging.

The strength of Mr. Spencer's writings lies first in the absolute perfection of his logic: to use a mechanical analogy, they are as it were the outpourings of a perfect logical machine, whose levers and cranks are so adjusted as to

PHILOSOPHERS

work without the possibility of error; a loom in which no strand of weft or woof has ever become entangled, and from which the finest cloth is drawn without spot or blemish. Deduction, Induction, and Verification are so perfectly blended that in this nineteenth century it seems impossible to conceive their higher development. The constituent parts of this logical method which usually excite the greatest wonder and surprise are the brilliant and unsurpassed power of generalization, which is ever present, and which unites in one whole subjects which at first appear to be as far removed as the antipodes upon our globe. This, of course, implies the knowledge of an immense range of subjects; and any one reading through, say, only one volume, such as 'First Principles,' may easily count up more than the metaphorical "speaking acquaintance" with over thirty clearly and well defined sciences, commencing with Anatomy at one end of the alphabet, and ending with Zoölogy at the other. How accurate this knowledge is may be seen by the currency his writings have amongst men of pure science,—meaning by this term specialists in the smaller departments and branches of human understand-

HERBERT SPENCER

ing. Any errors of detail would have been fatal to this vogue. At the same time we are bound to admit that amongst metaphysicians, or philosophers *pur et simple*, Mr. Spencer has not so large a following. It is quite possible, however, that this may be only temporary; and that as years roll on more may rally to the standard of a philosophy based on a greater knowledge of the human understanding than has ever before been brought to the world's notice.

One broad result stands out ever clearer. Mr. Spencer's development and applications of the theory of Evolution have more profoundly influenced contemporary thought, in every branch of life, than the work of any other modern thinker. It is not for no purpose that he has devoted the entire energies of an invalid to give an account to us, not only of the world in which we live, and of the other worlds which night alone shows forth, but of the whole Universe containing worlds of which we reckon not.

J. Howard Collins.



PLATO
(427-347 B.C.)

BY
PAUL SHOREY



PLATO



PLATO, the first of philosophers, and the only writer of prose who ranks in the literature of power with the bibles and supreme poets of the world, was born at Athens in the year 427 B. C., and died in the year 347. His youth was contemporaneous with that fatal Peloponnesian war in which the Athens of Pericles dissipated, in a fratricidal contest, the energies that might have prolonged the flowering season of the Greek genius for another century. His maturity and old age were passed as writer and teacher in the subdued and chastened Athens of the restoration, whose mission it was, as schoolmaster of Greece, to disengage the spirit of Hellenism from local and temporal accidents, and prepare it—not without some loss of native

PHILOSOPHERS

charm—for assimilation by the Hellenistic, the Roman, the modern world. Like his pupil the Stagirite Aristotle, he embraces in the compass of his thoughts the entire experience, and reflective criticism of life, of the Greek race. But because he was an Athenian born, and had nourished his mighty youth on the still living traditions of the great age, he transmits the final outcome of Greek culture to us in no quintessential distillation of abstract formulas, but in vivid dramatic pictures that make us actual participants in the spiritual intoxication, the Bacchic revelry, of philosophy, as Alcibiades calls it, that accompanied the most intense, disinterested, and fruitful outburst of intellectual activity in the annals of mankind.

It was an age of discussion. The influence of the French *salon* on the tone and temper of modern European literature has been often pointed out. But the drawing-room conversation of fine ladies and gentlemen has its obvious limits. In the Athens of Socrates, for the first and last time, men talked with men seriously, passionately, on other topics than those of business or practical politics; and their discussions created the logic, the rhetoric, the psychology, the metaphysic, the ethi-

PLATO

cal and political philosophy of western Europe, and wrought out the distinctions, the definitions, the categories in which all subsequent thought has been cast. The Platonic dialogues are a dramatic idealization of that stimulating soul-communion which Diotima celebrates as the consummation of the right love of the beautiful; wherein a man is copiously inspired to declare to his friend what human excellence really is, and what are the practices and the ways of life of the truly good man. And in addition to their formal and inspirational value they remain, even after the codification of their leading thoughts in the systematic treatises of Aristotle, a still unexhausted storehouse of ideas, which, as Emerson says, "make great havoc of our originalities." This incomparable suggestiveness is due—after the genius of Plato—to the wealth of virgin material which then lay awaiting the interpretative ingenuity of these brilliant talkers, and the synoptic eye of the philosopher who should first be able to see the one in the many and the many in the one.

Before the recent transformation of all things by physical science, the experience of the modern world offered little to the gener-

PHILOSOPHERS

alizing philosophic mind which the Periclean Greek could not find in the mythology, the poetry, the art, the historical vicissitudes, the colonial enterprises, and the picturesquely various political life of his race. Modern science was lacking. But the guesses of the pre-Socratic poet-philosophers had started all its larger hypotheses, and had attained at a bound to conceptions of evolution which, though unverified in detail, distinctly raised all those far-reaching questions touching the origin and destiny of man and the validity of moral and religious tradition that exercise our own maturer thought.

The concentration and conscious enjoyment of this rich culture in the intense life of imperial Athens gave rise to new ideals in education, and to the new Spirit of the Age, embodied in the Sophists—or professional teachers of rhetoric and of the art of getting on in the world. Their sophistry consisted not in any positive intention of corruption, but in the intellectual bewilderment of a broad but superficial half-culture, which set them adrift with no anchorage of unquestioned principle or fixed faith in any kind of ultimate reality. They thus came to regard the conflicting religious, ethical, and social

PLATO

ideals of an age of transition merely as convenient themes for the execution of dialectical and rhetorical flourishes, or as forces to be estimated in the shrewd conduct of the game of life.

Among these showy talkers moved the strange uncouth figure of Socrates, hardly distinguished from them by the writers of comedy or by the multitude, and really resembling them in the temporarily unsettling effect, upon the mind of ingenuous youth, of his persistent questioning of all untested conventions and traditions. Two things, in addition to the stoic simplicity of his life, his refusal to accept pay for his teaching, and his ironical affectation of ignorance, especially distinguish his conversation from theirs: First, a persistent effort to clear up the intellectual confusion of the age before logic, by insistence on definitions that shall distinguish essence from accident. Second, an adamant faith in the morality of common sense, and in the absoluteness of the distinction between right and wrong.

Every student must decide for himself which he will accept as the probable Socrates of history: the homely portrait of Xenophon, or the speculative, super-subtle, mystic pro-

PHILOSOPHERS

tagonist of these dialogues, fertile in invention, inexhaustible in resource, equal to every situation, seemingly all things to all men, yet guarding ever his indomitable moral and intellectual integrity behind a veil of playful irony. This Platonic Socrates stands out as the second religious figure of the European world in the fourfold gospel of his conversation, his trial, his temptation, and his death, recorded in the 'Gorgias,' the 'Apology,' the 'Crito,' and the 'Phædo.' However much of this result criticism may attribute to the genius of the reporter, we divine a strangely potent personality in the very fact that he dominated to the end the imagination of a scholar who went to school to many other influences, and who absorbed the entire culture of that wondrous age in "a synthesis without parallel before or since." Amid all the dramatic variety, the curious subtlety, the daring speculation, the poetic Pythagorean mysticism of the later dialogues, the two chief Socratic notes persist. There is always an effort to dissipate the clouds of intellectual confusion by the aid of some logic of definition and relevancy; and however often the quest for absolute verities loses itself in baffling labyrinths of dialectic, or

PLATO

issues in an *impasse* of conflicting probabilities, the faith is never lost that truth exists, may be won by persistent wooing, and is in the end essentially moral.

Associated with Socrates are groups of the noble youths of Athens; with worthy burghers who are their parents, guardians, or friends, an inner circle of earnest disciples or devoted enthusiasts attached to the person of the master, an outer circle of local celebrities and of all the brilliant personalities whom the policy of Pericles drew to the Prytaneion of Greek intellect, — visiting sophists, rhetoricians, philosophers. The dramatic setting is some typical scene of Athenian life. Socrates returning from the campaign of Potidæa strolls into a gymnasium, inquires of the progress of the young men, and draws the reigning favorite Charmides into a discussion of the nature and definition of that virtue of temperance which is the bloom of youthful beauty. He is aroused at earliest dawn by the knock of the youthful enthusiast Hippocrates, who comes breathless to announce that "Protagoras is in town," and that there is to be a great gathering of wise men at the house of Callias. Thither they proceed, and hear and say many

PHILOSOPHERS

things. He meets Phædrus carrying a roll under his arm, and fresh from the rhetorical school of Lysias, and joins him in a constitutional beyond the city gates while they discourse on the philosophy of style, and incidentally on love. He is a guest at the banquet held to celebrate the success of Agathon's new tragedy at the Dionysiac festival; and after listening benignantly to the young men's euphuistic panegyrics on the great god Love, expounds to them the lore he learned from the wise woman Diotima; and then, as the night wears on, drinks all the guests under the table while he proves to Aristophanes and Agathon that the true dramatic artist will excel in both tragedy and comedy. Turning homeward from attendance on a religious ceremony at the Peiræus, he is constrained by the playful impertunity of a band of young friends to remain for the torchlight race in the evening. They proceed to the house of the delightful old man Cephalus, father of the orator Lysias, where a conversation springs up on old age and the right use of wealth, which insensibly develops into the long argument on the Republic or Ideal State, in which alone justice and the happy life are perfectly typed. Con-

PLATO

demned to drink the hemlock "for corrupting the youth," he spends the last hours in prison beguiling the grief of his distracted disciples with high disputations touching the immortality of the soul, striving

"—to unfold
What worlds or what vast regions hold
The immortal mind, that hath forsook
Her mansion in this fleshly nook."

The style is as various as are the themes. It ranges from homely Socratic parable and the simple exquisite urbanity of Attic conversation to the subtlest metaphysical disquisition, the loftiest flights of poetic eloquence, the most dithyrambic imaginative mysticism. The only limitation of this universality which the critics of antiquity could discover was the failure (in the 'Menexenus,' for example) to achieve sustained formal eloquence of the Demosthenic type. The thought was too curious and subtle, the expression charged with too many minor intentions, for that; the peculiar blending, in the Platonic diction, of colloquialism, dialectic precision, vivid imagination, and the tone of mystic unction unfitted it for the conventional effects of political oratory.

But no other prose writer manifests such

PHILOSOPHERS

complete and easy mastery of every note in the compass of his idiom as Plato possesses over the resources of Greek. He not only employs all styles separately at will, but modulates from one to the other by insensible transitions, that can be compared only to the effects of modern music. Platonic prose is an orchestral accompaniment of the thought; suggesting for every *nuance* of the idea its appropriate mood, and shot through with *leitmotifs* of reminiscence and anticipation, that bind the whole into emotional and artistic unity. He is not only the greatest but the first artist of an elaborate and curiously wrought prose diction. No writer before him had thus combined quotation, parody, literary and historic allusion, idiom, proverb, dialect, continued metaphor, and the dramatically appropriated technical vocabularies of all arts, sciences, and professions, to one resultant literary effect suited to his various meanings and moods. The nice finish of Demosthenes's comparatively simple oratorical prose was the outcome from a long evolution, and from the labors of three generations of orators and rhetoricians. The composite, suggestive, polychromatic, literary prose which is the ideal of the clever-

PLATO

est modern writers was created, in its perfection and without precedent, by the genius of Plato.

The reconstruction of a systematic philosophy for Plato must be left, in his own words, to "some very clever and laborious but not altogether enviable man." The notorious doctrine of Ideas is a language, a metaphysic, a mythology. "Socrates used to ask concerning each *thing*,—as justice, friendship, or the State,—What is it?" And so in the minor dialogues of search the definition pursued through many a dialectical winding in the dramatization of elementary logic came to be regarded as a real thing to be apprehended, and not as the mere "statement of the connotation of a term." "The naïve childish realism of the immature mind!" will be the confident comment of the hasty critic. But as against the deeper meaning of Plato such criticism is competent only to those, if any there be, who have completely solved the problem of the true nature of Universals. The medieval controversy still subsists under manifold disguises; and in the last resort, as Professor James picturesquely says, "introspective psychology is forced to throw up the sponge." We may

PHILOSOPHERS

classify the doctrine of Ideas as "logical realism"; but if we remember the kind of reality which Berkeley, Kant, Schopenhauer, Shelley, and the most delicate psychological analysis concur in attributing to the "things" of common sense, which Plato called shadows and copies of the ideas, we may well surmise that the Platonic doctrine is more nearly akin to modern psychological and poetical idealism than to the crude logical realism of the Middle Ages. The verification of this conjecture would take us too far afield. It is enough that general notions, forms, essences, purposes, ideals, are in a sense as real as brick and mortar. For Plato they are the supreme realities. The idea of a thing, its form, identifying aspect, purpose, and true function,—these, and not its material embodiment and perishable accidents, are what concern us. The very workman who makes a tool does not copy with Chinese fidelity the accidents of an individual pattern, but is guided by an ideal of a service or function which in the last analysis determines both material and form. Similarly the Divine Artist may be said to have created the world by stamping, in the limits of necessity, upon rude and shapeless chaos the informing types

PLATO

of harmonious order and his own beneficent designs. Lastly we may transfer the analogy to the social life of man, and say that the true educator, statesman, and ruler is he whose soul has risen to the apprehension of fixed eternal norms of virtue, law, the ideal city, the perfectly just man,—and who has the power to mold and fashion as nearly as may be to the likeness of these ideal types the imperfectly plastic human material—the “social tissue”—in which he works.

Thus the theory of ideas is a high poetic language, consistently employed to affirm the precedence of soul, form, ideal, reason, and design over matter, body, and the accidents, irrelevancies, imperfections, and necessary compromises of concrete physical existence.

“For Soul is Form, and doth the body make.”

From this it is but a step to the imaginative mythological personification of the ideas. They are beautiful shapes, almost persons, first beheld by the soul in pre-natal vision, and now in life's stormy voyage ever fleeting before us “down the waste waters day and night,” or gleaming “like virtue firm, like knowledge fair,” through the mists that encompass the vessel's prow. So conceived,

they provide a ready explanation or evasion of all the final problems which Plato was both unwilling and unable to answer in the sense of an unflinching materialistic nominalism. Our instantaneous *a priori* recognition of mathematical truth, the shaping of the vague chaos of sensation in predetermined molds of thought, the apprehension of norms of experience to which no finite experience ever conforms, our intuitions of a beauty, a goodness, a truth, transcending anything that earth can show, our persistent devotion to ideals that actual life always disappoints, our postulates of a perfection that rebukes and shames our practice,—what can these things mean save that all which we call knowledge here is a faint and troubled reminiscence of the Divine reality once seen face to face, a refraction of the white light of eternity by life's dome of many-colored glass, a sequence of shadow pictures cast on the further wall of the dim cavern in which we sit pinioned, our eyes helplessly averted from the true Light of the World?

But Plato does not, like the pseudo-Platonists, abandon himself to dreaming ecstasy. The theory of Ideas in its practical effect is a doctrine of the strenuous definition and

PLATO

application to life of regulative ideals. The multitude who lack such guiding aims live the "untested life" which Socrates pronounced intolerable. The so-called statesmen who fail to achieve them are blind leaders of the blind. The establishment in the mind of a clearly defined ethical and social ideal, as a touchstone of the tendencies of all particular acts and policies, is described in the language of poetical Platonism as the acquisition of the highest knowledge, the knowledge of the Idea of Good, on which the value of all partial and relative "goods" depends. The Idea of Good, supreme in the hierarchy of ideas, and last reached in the scale and process of pure dialectic, is the sun of the intelligible world; and, like its symbol, the visible sun, is not only the fountain of light and knowledge, but the source of motion, life, and existence. For—to translate the image into prose—institutions, laws, and systems of government and education have their origin and find their best explanation in the final purposes, the ultimate ethical and social ideals, of their founders and supporters. But the knowledge of the Idea of Good, though described as a vision, is not granted to visionaries. The relation of all action to

PHILOSOPHERS

a rational and consistent theory of practice presupposes a severe discipline in dialectic. And dialectic itself, so confusing and unsettling as practiced in imitation of Socrates and the Sophists by the irresponsible youth of Athens, may be safely studied only after a long preparatory training in all the culture and exact science of the age. Only to the elect few, who, triumphantly supporting these and many other tests of mind and body, attain the beatific vision, will Plato intrust the government of his perfect city and the guardianship of mankind. They represent for him the antithesis of the typical pettifoggers and brawling demagogues of the Athens that was "dying of the triumph of the liberal party." For these too he shapes, in many of the dialogues, a theory of unscrupulous cynical practice more coherent, doubtless, than anything in their minds, but serving in a way as an ideal of evil to oppose to his own idea or ideal of good. It has been affirmed that Plato was a bad citizen because he despaired of the Republic. But if we remember that, as Matthew Arnold says, Plato was right and Athens was doomed, if we recall the excesses of the post-Periclean demagogues, if we reflect on his bitter disillusion-

PLATO

ment in the brief tyrannical rule of the "good-and-fair" companions of his youth, we shall not censure him for "standing aside under a wall in a storm of dust and hurricane of driving wind," or seeking refuge in the "city of which a pattern is laid up in heaven." "He was born to other politics."

Platonism is much more than this doctrine of Ideas, or than any doctrine. The dialogues, apart from their dramatic interest and literary charm, make a manifold appeal to numerous abiding instincts and aptitudes of the human mind through dialectics, metaphysics, mysticism, and esthetic and ethical enthusiasm. Some hard-headed readers will use them as an intellectual gymnastic. The thrust and parry of logical fence, the close pursuit of a trail of ratiocination through all the windings and apparently capricious digressions of the argument, the ingenious *détours* and surprises of the Socratic Elenchus, the apparatus of definitions, divisions, and fine-spun distinctions,—these things are in themselves a pleasurable exercise to many minds. Others seek in the dialogues the gratification of that commonplace metaphysical instinct which Walter Pater warns us to

PHILOSOPHERS

suppress. Being and non-Being, the One and the many, the finite and the infinite, weave their endless dance through the 'Parmenides,' the 'Sophist,' and the 'Philebus.' We may say that it is barren logomachy, the ratiocinative faculty run to seed, if we will. The history of literature proves it what Plato called it: a persistent affection of discourse of reason in man. Certain Platonic dialogues exercise and gratify this instinct even more completely than Neo-Platonism, medieval scholasticism, Hegelianism, or the new psychological scholasticism of to-day. And so, to the amazement and disgust of the positivists, the stream of *résumés*, new interpretations, and paraphrases of the 'Sophist' and 'Parmenides' flows and will continue to flow.

Mysticism too "finds in Plato all its texts." The yearning toward an Absolute One, ineffable symbol of the unity which the soul is ever striving to recover amid the dispersions of life, the impulse to seek a spiritual counterpart for every material fact, the tantalizing glimpses of infinite vistas beyond the ken of the bodily eye, the aspirations that elude definition, and refuse to be shut in a formula, —to all these

PLATO

“ Fallings from us, vanishings,
Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized,”

Plato gives full recognition, while shunning with unerring tact their concrete superstitious developments. His mystical imagery is always embroidered on a definite framework of thought. The attributes of the Absolute One are deduced as systematically as a table of logical categories. The structure of a Greek temple is not more transparently symmetrical than the allegory of the sun and the Idea of Good, the analogy of the divided line, and the symbolism of the Cave in the 'Republic'; or than the description, in the 'Phædrus,' of the soul as a celestial car, of which reason is the charioteer, and noble passion and sensuous appetite are the two steeds. The visions of judgment that close the 'Republic' and 'Gorgias' are as definite in outline as a picture of Polygnotus. All nobler forms of mystic symbolism, from Plotinus to Emerson, derive from Plato; all its baser developments, from Iamblichus to the newest thaumaturgic theosophy, seek shelter under his name.

Allied to mysticism is the quality which the eighteenth century deprecated as enthu-

PHILOSOPHERS

siasm. The intellect is suffused with feeling. All the nobler sentiments partake of the intensity of passionate love and the solemnity of initiations. Hence the sage and serious doctrine of Platonic love, whose interpretation and history would demand a volume:—

“ Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting
And cometh from afar.”

All noble unrest and higher aspiration in this world is a striving to recapture something of the rapture of the soul's pre-natal vision of the Divine ideas. Now the good and the true are apprehended dimly through the abstractions of dialectic. The idea of beauty alone finds a not wholly inadequate visible embodiment on earth. And so the love of beauty is the predestined guide to the knowledge of the good and the true. In the presence of the beautiful the soul is stung by recollection of the Idea, and yearns for an immortality which the mortal can put on only through generation. To this throe, this yearning, awakened by the sight of a beautiful body, men give the special name love. But love in the larger sense is all passionate

PLATO

thirst for happiness, all thrilling recollection of the absolute beauty, all desire to reproduce it on earth, not merely after the flesh, but in such immortal children of the spirit as the poems of Homer and Sappho, the laws of Solon and Lycurgus, the victories of Epaminondas.

“ The noble heart that harbors virtuous thought,
And is with child of glorious great intent,
Can never rest until it forth have brought
Th' eternal brood of glory excellent.”

For this higher love the lower is a preparation and an initiation.

Akin to this enthusiasm of the lover is the fine frenzy of the poet, who, by visitation of the Muse, is inspired to utter many strange and beautiful sayings, of which he can render no account under a Socratic cross-examination. This power of the Muse resembles the magnet, which both attracts and imparts its attractive virtue to other substances. And when a vast audience thrills with terror and pity as the rhapsode, tears in his eyes, distraction in 's aspect, recites the sorrows of Priam or Hecuba, they are all dependent links in the magnetic chain that descends from the poet and the Muse.

The 'Vita Nuova' of Dante, the sonnets of

PHILOSOPHERS

Michael Angelo, the 'Eroici Furori' of Bruno, the spiritual quality of the higher poetry of the Italian and English Renaissance, and the more recent names of Shelley, Wordsworth, and Emerson, faintly indicate the historic influence of these beautiful conceptions.

In later years Plato's "enthusiasm" was transmuted into a prophetic puritanic world-reforming temper,—the seeming antithesis of this gracious philosophy of love and beauty. His work was from the beginning as intensely moralized as were the discourses of Socrates. On whatever theme you talked with Socrates, it was said, you would in the end be forced to render an account of the state of your soul. And so in Plato every text is improved for edification, "the moral properties and scope of things" are kept constantly in sight, and the unfailing ethical suggestiveness of the style intensifies the moral sentiment to a pitch of spiritual exaltation that makes of Platonism one of the great religions of the world. But the age as we see it in Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Euripides was one of "enlightenment," skepticism, and the breaking up of traditional moral restraints. And as he watched year

PLATO

by year the deterioration of the Athenian civic temper, and the triumph of the mocking spirit of denial, Plato's passionate concern for the moral side of life developed into something akin to the temper of the Hebrew prophet, preaching righteousness to a stubborn and perverse generation, or the modern Utopian reformer, dashing his angry heart against the corruptions of the world. The problems which increasingly absorb his attention are the disengagement from outworn forms of the saving truths of the old religion and morality, the polemic defense of this fundamental truth against the new Spirit of the Age, and the salvation of society by a reconstitution of education and a reconstruction of government.

These are the chief problems, again, of our own age of transition; and the 'Republic,' in which they find their ripest and most artistic treatment, might seem a book of yesterday—or to-morrow. The division of labor, specialization, the formation of a trained standing army, the limitation of the right of private property, the industrial and political equality of women, the improvement of the human breed by artificial selection, the omnipotence of public opinion, the reform of

PHILOSOPHERS

the letter of the creeds to save their spirit, the proscription of unwholesome art and literature, the reorganization of education, the kindergarten method, the distinction between higher and secondary education, the endowment of research, the application of the higher mathematics to astronomy and physics,—such are some of the divinations, the modernisms, of that wonderful work. The framework is a confutation of ethical skepticism by demonstration that morality is of the nature of things, and the just life is intrinsically happier than the unjust. The nature of justice can be studied only in the larger life of the State. A typical Greek city is constructed,—or, rather, allowed to grow,—and by the reform of education is insensibly transformed into the ideal monarchy or aristocracy, governed by philosopher-statesmen who have attained to the Idea of Good. The existing degenerate forms of government are reviewed, and estimated by their approximation to this perfect type; and by means of an elaborate psychological parallel between the individual and the social constitution it is inferred that the superior happiness of the “just man” is proportional to the perfection of the best city.

PLATO

The puritanic temper reveals itself in the famous banishment of Homer. In the course of a criticism of Greek anthropomorphism, which was repeated almost verbatim by the Christian fathers, the tales told of the gods by Homer are deprecated as unsuitable for the ears of the young. As his conception of education broadens, Socrates unfolds the Wordsworthian idea of the molding influence upon character of noble rhythms, and a beautiful and seemly environment of nature and art; and ordains that in the perfect city all art and literature must be of a quality to produce this ennobling effect. Lastly, recurring to the topic with deeper analysis in the closing book, he rejects all forms of dramatic, flamboyant, luscious art and literature as superficial mimicries twice removed from absolute truth, unwholesome stimulants of emotion, and nurses of harmful illusions. We may not, with Ruskin, pronounce this a quenching of the imagination and of the poetic sensibilities by the excess of the logical faculty. Plato is only too conscious of the siren's charm:—"And thou too, dear friend, dost thou not own her spell, and most especially when she comes in the guise of Homer? But great is the prize for which we strive;

PHILOSOPHERS

and what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world of poetry and art, and lose his own soul?"

" But all those pleasant bowers and palace brave
Guyon broke down with rigor pitiless,
Ne aught their goodly workmanship might save
Them from the tempest of his wrathfulness."

The 'Republic' undertakes to prove that virtue is its own reward, and needs no other wage here or hereafter. But at the close the imperious human cry makes itself heard: "Give her the wages of going on, and not to die." The beautiful tale of salvation related by Er the son of Armenius is like the myth at the close of the 'Gorgias'; and the description of the blissful region of the "upper earth" in the 'Phædo' rather an "intimation of immortality" than a cogent logical demonstration. Plato sketches many such proofs: the soul possesses concepts not derived from experience; the soul is an uncomposite unity; the soul is a spontaneous source of motion. But, like the myths, these arguments are rather tentative expressions of a rational hope than dogmatic affirmations or organic members of a system. Yet the traditional conception of Plato as the champion

PLATO

of immortality and the truths of natural religion is justified by the fact that in the age when traditional religion first found itself confronted with the affirmations of dogmatic science, and with the picture of a mechanical universe that left no place for God or the soul, he, at home in both worlds of thought, stood forward as a mediator, and demonstrated this much at least: that a purely sensationist psychology fails to yield an intelligible account of mind, and that the dogmatism of negation is as baseless as the dogmatism of unlicensed affirmation.

Space does not admit a sketch of the even history of the Platonic dialogues, and their domination of the thought of intensely vital ages, like the Renaissance and our own time. Their influence in literature, philosophy, and the higher education has perhaps never been greater than in the past thirty years. No original book of this generation has done more to shape the thought of our time than Jowett's admirable translation, accompanied by notes and analyses. This translation, with Grote's elaborate study in four volumes, Zeller's 'History of Greek Philosophy,' Campbell's excellent article in the 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' and Walter Pater's exquisite

PHILOSOPHERS

'Plato and Platonism,' will meet all the needs of the general student. The latest edition of Zeller will guide scholars to the enormous technical literature of the subject.

Paul Sherry







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